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TOWARDS AN INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE OF
IMPRISONMENT FOR LEGAL FINANCIAL
OBLIGATION NONPAYMENT IN WASHINGTON STATE
Devon King
Abstract: Imprisonment for debt is resurfacing in the United States, primarily in the form
of contempt proceedings for failure to pay court judgments. Although Washington’s
Constitution prohibits imprisonment for debt, the State repeatedly jails individuals for failing
to pay legal financial obligations. This Comment explores the adverse consequences of this
de facto debtors’ prison system, describes the strong prohibition on imprisonment for debt
found in article I, section 17 of the Washington Constitution, and argues that imprisonment
for failing to pay legal financial obligations violates that strong prohibition. It then discusses
how case law has degraded article I, section 17, making systemic constitutional challenges to
the practice impractical. This Comment attempts to provide litigants with a comprehensive
overview of strategies that can be used to challenge the current jurisprudence and the validity
of imprisoning individuals for failing to pay legal financial obligations.

INTRODUCTION
Jane Doe1 is going back to jail. Years ago, Jane was incarcerated for a
felony offense committed in Washington State. She left prison owing the
state $2500 in Legal Financial Obligations (“LFOs”).2 Although she
fully intended to satisfy her LFO debts as soon as possible, Jane faced
serious difficulties reintegrating into society. She was unable to secure
gainful employment after losing her job for being unable to work while
incarcerated.3 She had a hard time securing steady housing and had
1. Jane is a hypothetical, statistically average low-income felony offender in Washington State.
2. Two thousand, five-hundred dollars of LFO debt upon release (including restitution) is just
below the average assessment in Washington State. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF WASH. &
COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVS., MODERN-DAY DEBTORS’ PRISONS: THE WAYS COURT-IMPOSED DEBTS
PUNISH PEOPLE FOR BEING POOR 3 (2014), available at https://acluwa.org/sites/default/files/
attachments/Modern%20Day%20Debtor%27s%20Prison%20Final%20%283%29.pdf [hereinafter
MODERN-DAY DEBTORS’ PRISONS] (“The average amount of LFOs imposed in a felony case is
$2540.”); KATHERINE BECKETT ET AL., THE ASSESSMENT AND CONSEQUENCES OF LFOS IN
WASHINGTON STATE 15 (2008) (report prepared for the Washington State Minority Justice
Commission).
3. See BECKETT ET AL., supra note 2, at 4; MODERN-DAY DEBTORS’ PRISONS, supra note 2
(“[U]p to 60% of former inmates remain unemployed one year after release from prison.”); Alicia
Bannon et al., Criminal Justice Debt: A Barrier to Reentry, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE 27–28
(2010), http://brennan.3cdn.net/c610802495d901dac3_76m6vqhpy.pdf (noting that because
employment background checks are increasingly including credit checks, LFO debts can both
hinder job prospects and serve as a “back-door” method for employers to identify individuals with
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barely begun to confront the social costs arising from state custody.4 The
deterioration of her social supports, combined with the economic costs
of reentry, as well as costs imposed by the state made her situation bleak
indeed. Ironically, the cost of her past incarceration is the very thing that
is sending her back to jail. Since her first release, she has paid ten dollars
per month without fail toward her account—a typical minimum payment
expected of low-income felons.5 Despite adhering to her self-imposed
payment schedule, yearly interest and surcharges have nearly tripled her
LFO debts in ten years:
Year
09
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Amount
Reduced6
$0
$120
$120
$120
$120
$120
$120
$120
$120
$120
$120

Amount
Increased7
$250010
$385.60
$431.87
$454.89
$495.08
$540.09
$590.50
$646.96
$710.20
$781.02
$760.35

Total Owed
at Year End8
$2500
$2765.60
$3077.47
$3412.36
$3787.44
$4207.53
$4678.03
$5204.99
$5795.19
$6456.21
$7096.56

criminal records).
4. See BECKETT ET AL., supra note 2, at 10–11; Bannon et al., supra note 3, at 27–28 (stating that
criminal justice debt affects housing prospects by damaging credit and discouraging legitimate
employment).
5. A ten-dollar monthly payment is a “typical amount” imposed on many low-income LFO
debtors. Joseph Shapiro, As Court Fees Rise, the Poor Are Paying the Price, NAT’L PUB. RADIO
(May 19, 2014, 4:02 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312158516/increasing-court-fees-punishthe-poor.
6. This hypothetical schedule of LFO debt is based on the debtor religiously making a ten-dollar
per month payment on her principal. The amount reduced does not include any “credits” granted by
the county as required in superior court. See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.01.180(3) (2014).
7. The yearly increase is calculated by calculating a twelve percent interest assessment provided
by RCW 10.82.090, RCW 4.56.110(4), and RCW 19.52.020(1) against the amount owed at prior
year’s end, less the amount paid. Then, the $100 yearly surcharge on unpaid LFOs provided by
RCW 36.18.016(29) is added to the amount of interest owed, determining the yearly increase.
8. The amount owed at year-end is calculated by subtracting the amount reduced from the amount
owed for the prior year, then adding the amount increased.
9. Time of Jane’s release.
10. Jane’s LFO assessment is based on the Washington State average. BECKETT ET AL., supra
note 2, at 15 (noting the mean felony LFO assessment in 2008 was $2540).
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The State, finally fed up with her growing debt, is now imprisoning
Jane for failing to pay.11 Her debt feels insurmountable.12 Maybe, rather
than throw away $120 per year at an ever-growing debt, she will just do
her time and stop making payments.13 After all, she can be imprisoned
for nonpayment regardless of her good faith attempts to contribute.14
Jane’s case, while hypothetical,15 is representative of the difficulties
faced by many low-income felony offenders in Washington State.16
Washington courts impose LFOs on felony offenders17 in order to help
fund the criminal justice system and, in some cases, accumulate
revenue.18 When individuals fail to pay their LFOs, they can be19 and
often are imprisoned.20 Many scholars are decrying Washington’s and
other states’ LFO collection tactics as resurging debtors’ prisons.21

11. Imprisonment for failing to pay LFO debts is authorized by RCW 10.01.180(5). Under that
section, “[a] default in the payment of a fine or costs or any installment thereof may be collected by
any means authorized by law for the enforcement of a judgment.” WASH. REV. CODE
§ 10.01.180(5).
12. See BECKETT ET AL., supra note 2, at 39 (describing the insurmountable nature of study
participants’ LFO assessments).
13. Id. (explaining how, when study participants’ debts became so insurmountable, they
ultimately decided to cease making contributions).
14. This is the reasoning underlying some individuals’ decisions to cease paying monthly
installment toward their LFO debts. Id. at 3, 39.
15. For real life stories highlighting the consequences of LFOs and imprisonment for
nonpayment, see MODERN-DAY DEBTORS’ PRISONS, supra note 2, at 11–18 (stories of Virginia
Dickerson, David Ramirez, Angela Albers, C.J., and D.Z.).
16. See BECKETT ET AL., supra note 2, at 9–10 (discussing rising felony incarceration rates in
Washington State as well as the reintegration difficulties experienced by rehabilitated felons);
Shapiro, supra note 5. Although this news story was a national exposé on LFO incarceration, the
report significantly focused on the plight of individuals in Benton County, Washington. Id.
17. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 38.52.430 (2014) (imposing the costs of emergency response
on individuals who are convicted of or have had their prosecution deferred for driving under the
influence).
18. See Shapiro, supra note 5 (noting that Benton County’s LFO collections practices make “it
one of the state’s top revenue producers”).
19. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.01.180(5) (“A default in the payment of a fine or costs or any
installment thereof may be collected by any means authorized by law for the enforcement of a
judgment.”).
20. See BECKETT ET AL., supra note 2, at 42–46 (interviewing individuals who have been
imprisoned for failing to pay LFO debts).
21. See, e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S NEW
DEBTORS’ PRISONS 5 (2010) [hereinafter IN FOR A PENNY], available at
https://www.aclu.org/prisoners-rights-racial-justice/penny-rise-americas-new-debtors-prisons
(describing LFO systems as modern-day ‘debtors’ prisons); MODERN-DAY DEBTORS’ PRISONS,
supra note 2, at 3 (“[Imprisonment for LFO nonpayment is] a modern version of the despised
debtors’ prison.”); John B. Mitchell & Kelly Kunsch, Of Driver’s Licenses and Debtor’s Prison, 4
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Public sentiment is largely critical of LFOs, fueled in part by the
discussion surrounding Ferguson, Missouri.22
The Washington State Supreme Court has been active in this area of
the law, handing down rulings that champion the rights of individual
offenders. For example, the Court recently invalidated Spokane’s “autojail” policy, which mandated imprisonment upon LFO default.23 Even
when the litigants fail to timely raise arguments challenging their LFOs,
the Supreme Court is willing to accept discretionary review and overturn
and remand LFO assignments.24 Although the validity of imprisonment
for LFO default was arguably irrelevant to the individual litigants’
claims in State v. Blazina,25 the Court devoted a large portion of its
opinion to describing problems within Washington’s LFO system. 26 The
Court is sensitive to the mechanisms used to fund the criminal justice
system and the negative impacts those funding mechanisms have on

SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 439, 443 (2005) (“[I]mprisonment for unpaid LFOs] cannot help but conjure
up images of debtors’ prisons from Dickens.”); Bannon et al., supra note 3, at 5 (“[LFOs] leave
debtors vulnerable for violations that result in a new form of debtors’ prison.”).
22. On August 9, 2014, Officer Darren Wilson shot and killed Michael Brown in Ferguson,
Missouri. Larry Buchanan et al., What Happened in Ferguson, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-town-under-siege-afterpolice-shooting.html?_r=0. A Missouri grand jury declined to indict the officer on criminal charges,
sparking waves of national interest and protests. Id. Although the Department of Justice declined to
prosecute Officer Wilson, it conducted a thorough investigation into the state of criminal justice
affairs in Ferguson. Taking a critical approach to Ferguson’s use of LFOs and police officers as
collections agents, the report states:
Ferguson’s law enforcement practices are shaped by the City’s focus on revenue rather than by
public safety needs. This emphasis on revenue has compromised the institutional character of
Ferguson’s police department, contributing to a pattern of unconstitutional policing, and has
also shaped its municipal court, leading to procedures that raise due process concerns and
inflict unnecessary harm on members of the Ferguson community. Further, Ferguson’s police
and municipal court practices both reflect and exacerbate existing racial bias, including racial
stereotypes.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT 2 (2015); see also Eric Scigliano, Reforming Ferguson-Style “Debtors Prisons” Here
in Washington State, CROSSCUT.COM (Apr. 10, 2015), http://crosscut.com/2015/04/ferguson-styledebtors-prisons-here-in-washington-state/ (discussing “Ferguson-style ‘debtors’ prisons’” in the
form of imprisonment for LFO default in Washington State).
23. State v. Nason, 168 Wash. 2d 936, 948, 223 P.3d 848, 853 (2010) (holding Spokane,
Washington’s “auto-jail provision” violated due process because individuals were automatically
jailed for LFO nonpayment without a determination of willfulness).
24. See State v. Blazina, 182 Wash. 2d 827, 833–34, 344 P.3d 680, 683 (2015) (en banc) (stating
that although the parties failed to preserve the issue and the lower court declined to review the issue,
the Washington State Supreme Court reached the merits of Mr. Blazina’s case, ultimately
overturning his LFO assessment).
25. 182 Wash. 2d 827, 344 P.3d 680 (2015) (en banc).
26. Id. at 835–37, 344 P.3d at 683–85 (“These problems include increased difficulty in reentering
society, the doubtful recoupment of money by the government, and inequities in administration.”).
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low-income individuals.27 It has granted review in multiple cases
adjudicating the validity of imprisoning individuals for LFO
nonpayment on a case-by-case basis.28 However, litigants have not yet
presented the Court with a case in which it can strike down, or at least
severely abrogate, the LFO imprisonment system as a whole.29
Relying on the Washington Constitution,30 this Comment provides
litigants with the tools necessary to begin building that case, challenging
27. Recently, the Court voted to increase traffic fines by twelve dollars. In re Adoption of the
Amendment to IRLJ 6.2, No. 25700-A-1103 (May 12, 2015). “Chief Justice Barbara Madsen said in
a news release Monday that raising the cost of the tickets was a tough decision, because the
operations of the court system should not depend on fees and fines, which disproportionally hurt
low-income people.” Gene Johnson, Washington Supreme Court Boosts Costs of Traffic Tickets,
SEATTLE TIMES (May 18, 2015), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/washington-supremecourt-boosts-cost-of-traffic-tickets/. The decision was met with two vigorous dissents which pointed
out the disproportionate impact increased fines would have on low income and minority individuals.
In re Adoption of the Amendment to IRLJ 6.2, No. 25700-A-1103 (May 12, 2015) (McCloud, J.,
dissenting).
The data shows that the majority of fees generated from infractions come not from the base
infraction fee or even from the several additional, mandatory fees that the governing statutes
tack on. Instead, the majority of those fees come from penalties imposed when a payment is
missed, for whatever reason. In other words, the people who are least able to pay up front, all
at once, are the ones who end up paying the most. That was not fair in Blazina, and it’s still not
fair here.
Id. Referencing the Department of Justice report explaining LFOs in Ferguson, Missouri, Justice
McCloud calls into question whether or not Washington courts should actually be funded through
“user fees that disproportionately burden those who can least afford it.” Id. “The majority’s position
is consistent with best practice and the national standard. But that system is broken.” Id.
28. Nason, 168 Wash. 2d 936, 223 P.3d 848; Blazina, 182 Wash. 2d 827, 344 P.3d 680.
29. As of the publishing of this Comment, most litigants challenging imprisonment for LFO
default have argued that a single individual’s—rather than all affected individuals’—due process
rights were violated. See, e.g., Nason, 168 Wash. 2d at 940, 233 P.3d at 849; Blazina, 182 Wash. 2d
at 837–39, 344 P.3d at 685. Even cases that have not yet made it to the Washington State Supreme
Court bring due process claims. See, e.g., Rucker v. Spokane Cnty., No. CV-12-5157-LRS, slip op.
at *1 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 26, 2013) (granting partial summary judgment for defendants on an aspect
of plaintiff’s federal due process claim); State v. Nash, No. 38514-7-II, 2011 WL 198695 at *1, *3–
4 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2011). Although the trial court determined that Mr. Nash could not be
assessed any monthly payment, the Court of Appeals refused to use the Due Process Clause to
invalidate his LFO obligations. Id. Obligations that, due to interest charges, had ballooned from his
initial assessment of $3,976.00 to $8,138.58. Id. Due process is not violated unless the state
imprisons the individual for default without making an individualized determination as to whether
that person had the ability to pay. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668 (1983). As exemplified by
the cases discussed above, unless the system violates everyone’s due process rights by failing to
determine if everyone’s nonpayment was willful (as was the case in Nason), it cannot be invalidated
systemically using due process—it can only be examined on an individual level. Washington’s
current LFO system does not, in itself, violate due process per se as it does provide an individual
assessment of indigence. See Bearden, 461 U.S. at 668. Although the Bearden court held an
indigent individual could not be imprisoned by the state for failing to pay, it explained “[i]f the
probationer has willfully refused to pay the fine or restitution when he has the means to pay, the
State is perfectly justified in using imprisonment as a sanction to enforce collection.” Id.
30. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 17 (imprisonment for debt).
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imprisonment for LFO default on a systemic level. This Comment
argues that modern courts should return to the original, robust
understanding of citizens’ rights against imprisonment for debt—an
understanding that would invalidate much of the current LFO
imprisonment system. Part I provides a brief history of imprisonment for
debt in the United States. Part II sets forth the current system of
imprisonment for LFO default, focusing primarily on Washington State,
and highlights the policy arguments against imprisoning individuals for
failing to pay. Part III explains why imprisonment for LFO nonpayment
violates the state constitution, examining the original purpose of article I,
section 17 as well as the provision’s more recent judicial degradation. It
separates the case law into three eras, highlighting the cases that
incrementally deviated from the foundational doctrine: Modern
jurisprudence (the Third Era) deviates from the foundational principles
(set forth in the First Era) by applying inaccurate precedent (created in
the second Era). Finally, Part IV argues that the statutory scheme
enabling imprisonment for failing to pay LFOs violates article I, section
17’s foundational jurisprudence.
I.

IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT IS PROHIBITED IN THE
WESTERN WORLD

History has borne continuous witness to rises and falls in
imprisonment for debt.31 Although the practice has had its moments of
popularity throughout history, those moments have been stymied by
peoples such as the Romans,32 feudal lords,33 the Normans,34 the
English,35 and the Americans. Historical arguments calling
imprisonment for debt into question are still relevant today.
Debtors’ prisons were rampant in eighteenth century England.36
31. See Richard E. James, Note, Putting Fear Back into the Law and Debtors Back into Prison:
Reforming the Debtors’ Prison System, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 143, 145–49 (2002).
32. See, e.g., JOHN A. CROOK, LAW AND LIFE OF ROME 172–73 (1967); Becky A. Vogt, State v.
Allison: Imprisonment for Debt in South Dakota, 46 S.D. L. REV. 334, 339 (2001).
33. See Mitchell & Kunsch, supra note 21, at 445 (“Feudal lords simply could not have their
vassals, who were fodder in the Lord’s army, unavailable for military service because they were
languishing in some debtor’s prison.”).
34. See Vogt, supra note 32, at 340.
35. See Stephen J. Ware, A 20th Century Debate About Imprisonment for Debt, 54 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 351, 376–77 (2014) (noting that imprisonment for debt was not formally abolished by
parliament until 1970).
36. See id. at 352–53 (2014). Using a writ of capias ad respondendum, the creditor would swear
the debt was overdue or the debtor intended to hide, flee, or conceal property. PETER J. COLEMAN,
DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA: INSOLVENCY, IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND
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Although creditors could seize a person’s property in lieu of
imprisonment,37 most preferred to first jail the debtor in hopes of
compelling payment, turning to forced property sale only if debtors’
prison failed to shake loose the coin owed.38
In English America, early settlers brought with them the concept of
imprisonment for debt39 and by the end of the seventeenth century
debtors’ prisons pervaded the English colonies.40 However, the colonists
soon realized that imprisoning debtors was not the ideal method to
compel payment: Debtors’ prisons exposed all borrowers, including
honest ones, to potential imprisonment in the hopes of protecting
creditors from “the tiny minority of scoundrels.”41 “Though the threat of
incarceration must have kept some borrowers honest, imprisonment
rarely pried loose concealed property and only sometimes prompted
friends or relatives to pay off the debt.”42 Imprisonment for debt locked
up valuable labor and forced the public to front the costs of supporting
many defaulters’ dependents.43 Some debtors’ prisons were notoriously
inhumane, a fact that, combined with the new Jeffersonian social reform
movement,44 fueled arguments in favor of abolishing debtors’ prisons.45
In the late eighteenth century, advocates began employing legal,
moral, and efficiency-based arguments to challenge debtors’ prisons in
England.46 They described imprisonment for debt as inhumane, arbitrary,
and inefficient.47 Legislators discussed alternatives to imprisonment,
such as executions of property, wage arrestment, and bankruptcy.48 They
recognized that debtors’ prisons, which caused “barbarity to the poor

BANKRUPTCY, 1607–1900, at 5 (1974). The court would then order the sheriff seize the debtor and
jail him or her until the principal was satisfied. Id. Alternatively, the creditor could employ a writ of
capias ad satisfactendum, causing the debtor to be jailed immediately and to remain in prison until
the debt was paid. Vogt, supra note 32, at 341.
37. See Vogt, supra note 32, at 342.
38. See id.
39. See COLEMAN, supra note 36, at 6.
40. See id. at 249.
41. Id. at 250.
42. Id.
43. See id.
44. See JOHN B. MCMASTER, THE ACQUISITION OF POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL RIGHTS
OF MAN IN AMERICA 52 (1903).
45. See COLEMAN, supra note 36, at 254–55.
46. See, e.g., JAMES STEPHEN, CONSIDERATIONS ON IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT (London, T. Evans
1770).
47. See id. at 5–6.
48. See Ware, supra note 35, at 373–75.
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unhappy class of people, who now breathe out their miserable lives in
loathsome prisons on civil actions,”49 were more likely to imprison
honest but unfortunate debtors than the dishonest men who were more
deserving of punishment.50 Such practice harmed both the honest debtors
and the spurned creditors by destroying the borrower’s estate without the
benefit of punishing those who maliciously abused commercial debt.51
The British critics’ American counterparts made similar arguments,
explaining that imprisonment for debt only worked in “barely a tenth of
the cases and . . . complained that the fear of imprisonment encouraged
deceit and fraud, and that honest defaulters went to jail while rogues
often went free.”52
In 1869, British Parliament began taking steps to strike down debtors’
prisons, starting with statutes prohibiting imprisonment for debt except
in limited situations such as contempt of court, defaulting on bankruptcy
orders, and debts owed to non-commercial creditors.53 However, by
maintaining creditors’ rights to use contempt to imprison individuals
who had failed to pay, Parliament undermined its credible attempt to
remedy the debtors’ prison problem. In response, Parliament gradually
narrowed its laws, eventually abolishing the practice entirely.54
Debtors’ prisons continued in America until the early 1800s when
states began abolishing the practice.55 By 1811, many eastern states had
abolished imprisonment for debt, and by the 1870s, most of the
remaining states and territories had followed suit.56 Imprisonment for
debt is currently prohibited by forty-one state constitutions.57

49. STEPHEN, supra note 46, at 45.
50. Id. at 55 (“It may seem a rash declaration, but it is strictly true, that a rogue has a much better
chance to obtain a certificate than an honest man; and the person who has little or nothing to give
up, than one who can make a good dividend.”).
51. Id.
52. COLEMAN, supra note 36, at 255.
53. See The Debtors Act, 1869, 32 & 33 Vict., c. 62 (Eng.); Ware, supra note 35, at 354–55.
54. Ware, supra note 35, at 376–77.
55. COLEMAN, supra note 36, at 256; James, supra note 31, at 147.
56. COLEMAN, supra note 36, at 256.
57. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 20; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 17; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 18; ARK.
CONST. art. II, § 16; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 12; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 11;
GA. CONST. § I, ¶ XXIII; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 19; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 15; ILL. CONST. art. I,
§ 14; IND. CONST. art. I, § 22; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 19; KAN. CONST. bill of rights, § 16; KY.
CONST. § 18; MD. CONST. art. III, § 38; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 21; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 12; MISS.
CONST. art. III, § 30; MO. CONST. art. I, § 11; MONT. CONST. art. III, § 12; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 20;
NEV. CONST. art. I, § 14; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 13; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 21; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 28;
N.D. CONST. art. I, § 15; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 15; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 13; OR. CONST. art. I,
§ 19; PA. CONST. art. I, § 16; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 11; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 19; S.D. CONST. art. VI,
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The fall of debtors’ prisons in both England and the early United
States was largely due to the fact that that imprisonment for debt failed
to accomplish repayment, caused negative social effects, and was
outweighed by adequate alternatives.58 These arguments still command
merit today.
II.

DEBTORS’ PRISONS ARE RESURGING IN THE UNITED
STATES IN THE FORM OF IMPRISONMENT FOR UNPAID
LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS

De facto debtors’ prisons exist in contemporary America.59 Because
they run contrary to federal60 and state law, they are “implemented
through the ‘smokescreen of civil contempt’”61: courts jail individuals
for willfully failing to pay a court-ordered judgment.62 While only about
one-third of states imprison individuals for contemptuous failure-to-pay,
a sanction intended to coerce payment,63 nearly all states continue to
sanction debtors for failing to appear.64
Perhaps the most compelling example of modern imprisonment for
debt in the guise of contempt is the practice of imprisoning individuals
for failing to pay LFOs. Many formerly incarcerated individuals re-enter
society owing the State fines, restitution, fees, and costs.65 Individuals
are often saddled with exorbitant interest rates, quickly transforming
§ 15; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 18; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 18; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 16; VT. CONST. c. 2,
§ 40; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 17; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 16; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 5.
58. James, supra note 31, at 148.
59. Id. at 149.
60. As early as 1896 there was a federal statute limiting imprisonment for debt. Id. at 154
(discussing §§ 990–992 of the Revised Statutes of the United States).
61. Id. at 165.
62. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 7.21.030(2)(a) (2014) (allowing Washington courts to imprison
an individual for contempt of court when the individual fails to complete a court ordered act that is
within her power).
63. Lea Shepard, Creditors’ Contempt, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1509, 1543 (2011).
64. Id. at 1544–45. Although there is a legal distinction between imprisonment for failing to
appear (a punitive action) and imprisonment for failing to pay (a coercive action), Shepard argues
that in practical application it is a distinction without a difference. Id. at 1545–48. She explains the
concept of “contempt confusion”—because failing to pay and failing to appear are inextricably
intertwined, “a court’s threat to imprison a debtor for failure to appear in court can put direct
pressure on the debtor to pay the creditor.” Id. at 1547. “Once a ‘no-show’ debtor is arrested or
threatened with arrest, she may find it difficult to distinguish between the immediate source of the
arrest threat, her failure to appear in court, and the proximate cause of the threat of incarceration: the
debt default itself.” Id. at 1546. In essence, imprisonment for failing to pay and imprisonment for
failing to appear are indistinguishable to the debtor.
65. Shapiro, supra note 5.
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even minor LFO debts into obligations that are difficult or impossible to
satisfy.66 Those who defy a court order to cure LFO nonpayment can be
held in contempt and jailed for default.67
The LFO system is closely tied to the “offender-funded” model of
criminal justice—financing the criminal justice system out of the
pockets of those who are entangled in it.68 Since the “tough-on-crime
era”69 when the offender-funded model was conceptualized, the
criminal-justice system has dramatically expanded.70 LFOs have grown
accordingly.71 What may have started as a workable solution to funding
problems has grown to impose impractical, even counterproductive
burdens on low-income offenders.
III.

DE FACTO DEBTORS’ PRISONS IN WASHINGTON STATE

Washington State’s legislative branch has firmly embraced the
“offender-funded” model of criminal justice. Washington State
contributes a mere 10.6% of the total cost of trial courts and indigent
defense—leaving local governments to come up with nearly ninety
percent of the total cost of Washington’s criminal justice system.72 Out
of every state in the nation, Washington ranks absolute last in funding
66. Id.; see also BECKETT ET AL., supra note 2, at 2 (“As a result of high rates of non-payment
and the accrual of interest, the legal debt of most of those sentenced . . . had grown rather than
shrunk [in three years].”).
67. BECKETT ET AL., supra note 2, at 58 (“Indeed, it appears that non-payment not uncommonly
leads to the issuance of a warrant, re-arrest, and re-incarceration in some Washington State
counties.”).
68. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PROFITING FROM PROBATION: AMERICA’S “OFFENDERFUNDED” PROBATION INDUSTRY 1–6 (2014), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/
2014/02/05/profiting-probation-0 (describing various modes of the offender funded model of
criminal justice as well as problems with its privatization).
69. See Shapiro, supra note 5 (noting the tough-on-crime policies began in the 1970s).
70. BECKETT ET AL., supra note 2, at 9; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
NCJ 243920, PRISONERS IN 2012: TRENDS AND ADMISSIONS AND RELEASES, 1991–2012, at 1
(2013) (“Between 1978 and 2009, the number of prisoners held in federal and state facilities in the
United States increased almost 430% from 294,400 on December 31, 1978, to 1,555,600 on
December 31, 2009.”).
71. Bannon ET AL., supra note 3, at 7 (“Criminal justice debt is growing at an alarming rate across
the country.”).
72. BD. FOR JUDICIAL ADMIN., JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: THE COURT FUNDING CRISIS IN
WASHINGTON STATE 5 (2004) [hereinafter JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY]. Since this report, the legislature
revised trial court funding procedures, hoping to ease the burden of the underfunded criminal justice
system. Act of May 13, 2005, ch. 457, 2005 Wash. Sess. Laws 1948. While this legislation has
helped, it has not alleviated much of the burden imposed on local governments. BD. FOR JUDICIAL
ADMIN., TRIAL COURT IMPROVEMENT ACCOUNT USE REPORT FOR 2013, at 11 (2014) (“In the
aggregate, TCIA funds account for a very small percentage of a court’s total budget.”).
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judicial and legal services.73 It is hard to blame legislators for turning to
the offender funded model to keep the system afloat—the money has to
come from somewhere. This Comment recognizes the State’s funding
crisis and does not mean to challenge the LFO system in its entirety.
LFOs that are timely paid do provide much needed funding for the state
criminal justice system. The Washington Legislature embraces them as
“an important part of taking personal responsibility for one’s actions.”74
However, as the subsequent sections explain, there are serious
problems with funding the criminal justice system by imprisoning
individuals for unpaid LFOs. Individuals who can easily understand and
pay their LFOs often satisfy their entire obligation right away, just as
you or I might pay a large traffic fine or IRS penalty. In such cases,
imprisonment is not required and the criminal justice system gets its
funding with arguably little expense. However, less fortunate individuals
are less likely to make timely LFO payments and thus more likely to
face imprisonment.75 Those that can and will pay their LFOs do so with
little state prodding while those that believe they cannot or are unwilling
to pay their LFOs face imprisonment—imprisonment that drains
government coffers and does not effectively compel payment.76
Doing away with imprisonment for LFO default would not do away
with the LFO funding mechanism. Those who can easily pay their LFOs
will still do so in a timely manner. Those that feel they cannot or are
unwilling to pay their LFOs will still go into default. Removing
imprisonment for debt would merely require the system to use different
existing—and perhaps more effective—methods such as wage
garnishment77 to compel LFO payment. Imprisoning defaulting
73. JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 72, at 4.
74. Legal Financial Obligations—Collection, ch. 106, 2011 Wash. Sess. Laws 943, § 1 (codified
at WASH. REV. CODE § 10.82.090 (2014)).
75. Although Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983), prohibits states from assessing LFOs
against indigent offenders (requiring a case-by-case determination), the process by which ability to
pay is determined by some Washington courts appears “to be standardized rather than based on an
assessment of the particular circumstances faced by defendants.” BECKETT ET AL., supra note 2, at
65; Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union and the Washington Defender Association as
Amicus Curiae at 5, State v. Nash, No. 38514-7-II at *1, *3–4 (2011); see also Bannon et al., supra
note 3, at 13 (“[N]one of the fifteen examined states pay adequate attention to whether individuals
have the resources to pay . . . .”).
76. See infra notes 117–39 and accompanying text.
77. Wage garnishment might be a viable alternative in part because of the additional protections
already in place. An employer may not terminate an employee for having their wages garnished.
WASH. REV. CODE § 6.27.170 (2014) (an employee may not be discharged for having two or fewer
wage garnishments per year). There is no such protection for employees who are imprisoned for
failing to pay LFOs. Furthermore, Washington has statutory protections in place to ensure that
garnishments are not overly-onerous on low income individuals. Id. § 6.27.150. The current wage
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offenders, although intended to help fund the criminal justice system,
imposes serious consequences that are not counterbalanced by program
success.78 Compared to other states, Washington’s LFO system imposes
one of the highest fees, costs, and interest79 bills on offenders.80
Washington imposes mandatory and discretionary LFOs, billing
offenders for the costs of and fees related to court-appointed attorneys,81
restitution,82 defense,83 fines,84 confinement,85 guilty convictions or
pleas,86 deferred prosecution,87 warrants for failing to appear,88 pretrial
supervision,89 impaneling a jury,90 extradition,91 electronic monitoring,92
emergency response,93 crime laboratory analysis,94 biological sample

garnishment structure already has provisions in place that could help compel LFO payment while
avoiding some of the negative effects of imprisonment.
78. For an examination of a similar problem with contempt proceedings and the offender-funded
model of criminal justice in the context of traffic fines and driver’s license suspensions in
Washington, see generally Mitchell & Kunsch, supra note 21.
79. Currently, the 2015 Washington Legislature is considering two bills intended to reform the
LFO imprisonment system. The bills as proposed would eliminate interest on non-restitution LFOs
and make it easier for judges to reduce or waive LFO debt. The bills also attempt to better define
willfulness in the context of indigent individuals’ failure to pay. H.R. REP. NO. 64-1390, Reg. Sess.,
at 3 (Wash. 2015); S. REP. NO. 64-5713, Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2015). However, the bills being
considered by the legislature still allow imprisonment for “willful” nonpayment of LFOs in the form
of civil contempt. H.R. REP. NO. 64-1390, Reg. Sess., at 3 (Wash. 2015) (report by H. Comm. on
Judiciary Appropriations); see also S. REP. NO. 64-5713, Reg. Sess., at 2 (Wash. 2015) (report by S.
Comm. on Law and Justice, Feb. 17, 2015). Although House Bill 1390 passed the House by an
astounding margin of ninety-four to four, it seems to have died on the Senate floor. S. REP. NO. 645713, Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2015); WASH. STATE LEG., SB 5713 – 2015-16 (Sept. 22, 2015),
http://app.leg.wa.gov/billinfo/summary.aspx?bill=5713&year=20150).
80. Michael L. Vander Giessen, Note, Legislative Reforms for Washington State’s Criminal
Monetary Penalties, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 547, 549 (2012).
81. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(30) (2014).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. § 9.94A.760(2) (imposing a cost of $50 per day for incarceration in prison and up to $100
per day for incarceration in county jail).
86. Id. § 36.18.020(2)(h) (2014) (imposing a cost of $200).
87. Id. § 10.01.160(2) (2014) (imposing a cost up to $250).
88. Id. (imposing a cost up to $100).
89. Id. (imposing a cost up to $150).
90. Id. § 36.18.016(3)(b) (imposing costs of $125 for six-person juries, and $250 for twelveperson juries).
91. Id. § 9.95.210(2).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. § 43.43.690(1) (2014) (imposing a mandatory fee of $100 for each offense).
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collection,95 interlocal drug funds,96 and “any other financial obligation
that is assessed to the offender as a result of a felony conviction.”97 The
municipal governments levy annual surcharges against unpaid LFOs98
and impose a twelve percent interest rate,99 the second highest in the
nation.100 Washington courts can101 and do102 utilize contempt to
imprison individuals for failing to pay LFOs. In superior court,
individuals must be credited a sum of money towards their obligations
each day they are imprisoned for default.103
A.

De Facto Debtors’ Prisons Have Adverse Consequences in
Washington

Imprisonment for failing to pay LFOs is not uncommon in
Washington.104 The practice has adverse consequences for defaulting
offenders as well as the public.105 Recent research suggests that
imprisonment does not efficiently compel LFO payment.106 Imposing a
95. Id. § 43.43.7541 (imposing a mandatory fee of $100 for each sentence imposed).
96. Id. § 9.94A.030(30).
97. Id.
98. Id. § 36.18.016(29) (limiting fees to $100 annually).
99. Id. § 10.82.090(1); id.§ 4.56.110(4); id.§ 19.52.020(1) (imposing an interest rate consisting of
the greater between twelve percent and four points above the Treasury Bill rate); H.R. REP. NO. 582485, Reg. Sess., at 2 (Wash. 2004) (finding that twelve percent has generally exceeded the
Treasury Bill, making twelve percent the interest rate on judgments for at least the prior decade).
100. Alison Warren, Support LFO Bills, THE SPOKESMAN REVIEW at B5 (Feb. 14, 2015).
101. Imprisonment for failing to pay LFO debts is authorized by WASH. REV. CODE
§ 10.01.180(5) (2014) (“A default in the payment of a fine or costs or any installment thereof may
be collected by any means authorized by law for the enforcement of a judgment.”).
102. See, e.g., State v. Nason, 168 Wash. 2d 936, 941, 223 P.3d 848, 849 (2010) (examining the
trial court’s decision ordering the defendant serve ninety-five days in jail for falling behind on LFO
payments); BECKETT ET AL., supra note 2, at 58.
103. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.01.180(3) (“If a term of imprisonment for contempt for nonpayment
of a fine or costs is ordered, the term of imprisonment shall be set forth in the commitment
order . . . . A person committed for nonpayment of a fine or costs shall be given credit toward
payment for each day of imprisonment at the rate specified in the commitment order.”). This act of
crediting individuals for their incarceration is conceptually similar to “peonage,” a practice
Congress outlawed early in United States history. Peonage Abolition Act, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546
(1867) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2012) and 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2012)). The United States
Supreme Court upheld this prohibition. Clyatt v. U.S., 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1905) (explaining
peonage).
104. BECKETT ET AL., supra note 2, at 58.
105. See Bannon et al., supra note 3, at 5 (“What at first glance appears to be easy money for the
state can carry significant hidden costs—both human and financial—for individuals, for the
government, and for the community at large.”).
106. See, e.g., James, supra note 31, at 166–67 (arguing that because the current use of debtors’
prisons is not transparent, modern debtors are unaware they risk imprisonment for failing to pay and
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punishment with such adverse consequences, absent evidence of
effectiveness, conflicts with the stated goals of the Washington
Sentencing Reform Act of 1981,107 including the enumerated
commitment to reducing recidivism.108
Warrants and arrests for failing to pay impose adverse consequences
on rehabilitated offenders. Contempt proceedings label defaulters as
“fleeing felons,” automatically disqualifying them from government
benefits designed to help provide the necessities of life.109 Imprisonment
has significant negative consequences for individuals, impacting
education, occupation, family life, credit scores, and ability to afford
child support.110 Individuals cannot vote until they have satisfied their
court-ordered LFOs.111 Many who are incarcerated for unpaid LFOs fall
below federal poverty guidelines.112 Often, they are trying to support
families and children while they pay, or fall behind, on their LFO
debt.113 Furthermore, LFOs affect minorities and the poor
disproportionately and exacerbate recidivism.114
Although the United States Supreme Court held it unconstitutional to
imprison indigent defendants for failing to pay,115 some scholars have
begun to question courts’ abilities to determine when an individual is
indigent and thus constitutionally protected.116 Washington’s current
practice risks incarcerating individuals who truly cannot pay.
thus are not deterred by the practice).
107. Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, ch. 137, 1981 Wash. Sess. Laws 519 (codified as amended
at WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A (2014)).
108. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.010 (“The purpose of [the Sentencing Reform Act] is to . . . (7)
[r]educe the risk of reoffending by offenders in the community.”); BECKETT ET AL., supra note 2, at
4 (“[W]e conclude that the legislature’s goal of holding offenders financially accountable for the
consequences of their criminal behavior is in tension with its efforts to reduce recidivism by
facilitating the successful reintegration of Washington State residents with a felony conviction.”).
109. BECKETT ET AL., supra note 2, at 3 (noting that “fleeing felons” are ineligible for Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families, Social Security Insurance, assisted housing, and food stamp
programs).
110. Id. at 10; see also Bannon et al., supra note 3, at 27–29.
111. Madison v. State, 161 Wash. 2d 85, 110–11, 163 P.3d 757, 773 (2007) (holding that
Washington’s felon disenfranchisement scheme prohibiting felons from voting until they have
satisfied all LFOs is constitutional); see also Bannon et al., supra note 3, at 29 (characterizing
criminal justice debt as a “poll tax”).
112. BECKETT ET AL., supra note 2, at 2–3.
113. Id. at 3, 32.
114. Id. at 57–59; Giessen, supra note 80, at 552–53.
115. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672–73 (1983).
116. BECKETT ET AL., supra note 2, at 65; Brief for the Washington Defender Association, et al.
as Amici Curiae at 5, State v. Nash, 2011 WL 198695 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2013) (No. 38514-7II); Bannon et al., supra note 3, at 13.
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Imprisonment for Failing to Pay LFOs Is Ineffective

Washington’s system adversely affects individuals and risks
incarcerating—and re-incarcerating—the indigent. Arguably those
downsides might be counterbalanced if the policy effectively
accomplished its goals. However, there is little evidence that
imprisonment compels LFO payment or deters default: “The threat of
criminal justice intervention create[s] an incentive for those who ha[ve]
not made regular LFO payments to hide from the authorities, but
nonetheless ma[kes] it difficult for those same persons to disentangle
themselves from the criminal justice system.”117 In a study examining
the consequences of LFO debt, some participants described the
overwhelming nature and sheer magnitude of their debt, and their
resulting decision to “ignore it entirely”:
Cause in all reality there’s no way I can pay it, so, I don’t worry
about it. If it came down to it, they put me in jail, I’d serve time
to pay off the fines, that would be fine with me, either way. I
mean, it’s impossible to pay. I only make $180 a month
anyway.118
Another participant lamented:
I mean, even if you have a normal job, you can’t really gain no
headway. I mean, the bottom line is if I go pay on it, and $50 a
month ain’t covering it, and I’m still, you know I’m still toiling
forward, then why would you want to pay on something without
seeing any deduction in the debt that you owe?119
Despite offenders being aware of their debts, there is little evidence that
the current LFO system adequately deters nonpayment. Many
individuals stop making payments because of the perceived
insurmountable barriers imposed by the system.120
Furthermore, when debtors do not understand the consequences of
nonpayment, they logically cannot be deterred from default. Individuals
lack clarity regarding their LFO obligations and rights121 and “the public
views the risk of imprisonment for debt to be either non-existent or very
small.”122 The likelihood that individuals will be deterred by the very
117. BECKETT ET AL., supra note 2, at 3–4.
118. Id. at 39.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 4–5, 39–40.
121. Id. at 47–52 (“[R]espondents described a profound sense of uncertainty about the rules
governing assessment and collection of their LFOs.”).
122. James, supra note 31, at 167.
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real—but little known—threat of imprisonment for LFO nonpayment is
proportionally small.123 Arguably, the Legislature’s “stealthy” use of
contempt to circumvent the constitutional prohibition on imprisonment
for debt has undone any chance of significant deterrence.124
Meanwhile, Washington counties are collecting barely a fraction of
total debts owed.125 According to analyses completed by Washington
State Representative Ross Hunter, more than eighty percent of LFOs are
“uncollectible.”126 When a county imprisons an LFO debtor, it pays for
that debtor’s incarceration costs, as well as a daily “credit” to the
debtor’s LFO account.127 For example, it costs Benton County,
Washington $65 per day to house and feed one inmate.128 The County
credits inmates $50 for every day they spend in jail.129 Each day Benton
County keeps an LFO defaulter in jail, its taxpayers lose at least $115.130
This calculation does not take into account the costs of police action,
prosecuting and defense attorneys, jail overcrowding, and opportunity
costs, all of which affect the extent of the system’s burden on
taxpayers.131 Imprisonment for failing to pay LFOs also diverts public
servants and officers from fulfilling their public safety and rehabilitation
purposes.132 In Ferguson, Missouri, the local government’s emphasis on
using police officers and courts to generate revenue exacerbated
community distrust, degrading citizens’ respect for the criminal justice
institution.133
Furthermore, when individuals are incarcerated, they are unable to
work and pay down their LFO debts. What was true in the nineteenth
123. Id.
124. Id. at 167–69.
125. Shapiro, supra note 5.
126. Ross Hunter, Debtors Prisons—Legal Financial Obligations, ROSSHUNTER.INFO (Mar. 11,
2015), http://www.rosshunter.info/2015/03/debtors_prisons/#_ftn1; see also BECKETT ET AL., supra
note 2, at 4 (“[Z]ero percent of the fees, fines and restitution orders assessed in 2004 were paid for
approximately half of the convictions three years post-sentencing.”).
127. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.01.180(3) (2014).
128. Shapiro, supra note 5.
129. Kristin M. Kraemer, Paying Fines with Jail Time Being Debated, TRI-CITY HERALD, Nov.
3, 2013, A1.
130. $65 + $50 = $115.
131. See Bannon et al., supra note 3, at 25–26 (calling imprisonment for LFO nonpayment
“penny-wise and pound-foolish” and explaining that “[w]hile states focus on the income such
collection practices bring in, they generally fail to look at the other side of the balance sheet,
including costs imposed on sheriffs’ offices, local jails and prisons, prosecutors and defense
attorneys, and the courts themselves”).
132. See Bannon et al., supra note 3, at 31.
133. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 22, at 2–6.
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century is just as true today: “Debtor’s prison does not work when the
debtor is impoverished. No money will be collected while the debtor is
incarcerated, and he or she likely will be poorer when released.”134
Expending public funds on a system that has not been shown to
effectively deter nonpayment, combined with the fact that individuals
are not making actual payments when they are imprisoned, is
inconsistent with one of the purposes of the Washington Sentencing Act
of 1981: to “[m]ake frugal use of the state’s and local governments’
resources.”135
Many scholars, researchers, and advocates criticize Washington’s
LFO imprisonment system as embodying debtors’ prisons.136 It is both
inefficient and socially detrimental. Washington couches imprisonment
for unpaid LFOs as imprisonment for contempt of court, a controversial
work-around borrowed from nineteenth century Parliament.137 Given the
heightened litigation in this area138 and authorities suggesting the LFO
imprisonment system is economically inefficient, one would think the
practice would currently be subject to considerable institutional
challenges. However, most advocates are challenging the system using
only case-by-case due process arguments.139
134. Mitchell & Kunsch, supra note 21, at 460.
135. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.010(6) (2014).
136. See, e.g., IN FOR A PENNY, supra note 21, at 5 (describing LFO systems as “modern-day
‘debtors’ prisons’”); MODERN-DAY DEBTORS’ PRISONS, supra note 2, at 3 (noting that
characterizing imprisonment for LFO nonpayment in Washington as “a modern version of the
despised debtors’ prison”); Mitchell & Kunsch, supra note 21, at 443 (noting that imprisonment for
unpaid LFOs “cannot help but conjure up images of debtors’ prisons from Dickens”); Bannon et al.,
supra note 3, at 5 (characterizing imprisonment for LFO nonpayment as “a new form of debtors’
prison”).
137. When crafting laws to limit imprisonment for debt, nineteenth century Parliament retained
an exception allowing imprisonment for contempt. Ware, supra note 35, at 355–56. The contempt
exception has been criticized by more modern scholars. Id. at 355 n.24.
138. See, e.g., Rucker v. Spokane Cnty., No. CV-12-5157-LRS, slip op. at *6 (E.D. Wash. Nov.
26, 2013) (granting partial summary judgment for defendants on an aspect of plaintiff’s federal due
process claim); State v. Nash, No. 38514-7-II, 2011 WL 198695, at *1, *3–4 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan.
6, 2011). Although the trial court determined that Mr. Nash could not be assessed any monthly
payment, the court of appeals refused to use the Due Process Clause to invalidate his LFOs. Id.
Obligations that, due to interest charges, had ballooned from his initial assessment of $3,976.00 to
$8,138.58. Id.; see also State v. Nason, 168 Wash. 2d 936, 948, 233 P.3d 848, 853 (2010)
(individual litigation invalidating Spokane, Washington’s “auto-jail provision” wherein individuals
were automatically jailed for LFO nonpayment without a determination of willfulness); Class
Action Complaint at 1–2, Cavnar v. Bounceback, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-00235-RMP, 2015 WL 4429095
(E.D. Wash. July 18, 2014) (class action challenging a private debt collector’s practice using the
county prosecutor’s letterhead to compel payment of court fees and fines).
139. None of the cases cited supra, note 138 made any citation to WASH. CONST. art. I, § 17
(prohibiting imprisonment for debt). According to WestlawNext, only seventy-eight cases have ever
cited the Washington constitutional prohibition on imprisonment for debt. The most recent case to

10 - King.docx (Do Not Delete)

1366

11/13/2015 2:39 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:1349

The subsequent sections set forth the tools necessary to attack
imprisonment for LFO nonpayment on a systemic level. This Comment
recognizes that case law has substantially abrogated the once robust
Washington constitutional prohibition on imprisonment for debt, making
a systemic challenge unrealistic. However, the current jurisprudence is
rife with inconsistencies, and this Comment argues that the Washington
State Supreme Court should revise its interpretation and return to the
foundational doctrine.
IV.

IMPRISONING INDIVIDUALS FOR LFO NONPAYMENT
VIOLATES THE WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION

Imprisoning individuals for failing to pay LFOs runs contrary to both
the spirit and the letter of Washington’s Constitution. However, the
Washington State Supreme Court has not yet declared this practice
unconstitutional. Over time, the jurisprudence expounding article I,
section 17 has become muddled, generating confusion and resulting in
doctrines that failed to respect foundational courts’ decisions and the
constitutional delegates’ original intent. This Comment clarifies the
meaning of article I, section 17 and explains how the provision’s plain
language and the strong populist ideals embodied in Washington’s bill of
rights conflict with the current LFO system. This Comment provides a
foundation that can be used to challenge the modern jurisprudence by
describing the evolution of article I, section 17 interpretations over time.
Modern case law misinterprets the precedent and fails to respect the
foundational doctrine set forth by the state’s first courts.
A.

The Plain Language of Washington’s Constitution Unambiguously
Prohibits Jailing Individuals for Failing to Pay LFOs

Washington’s LFO system and its resulting imprisonment for debt is
not the product of a weak constitutional provision. In fact, article I,
section 17 might be best described as strongly worded and “nononsense”:
There shall be no imprisonment for debt, except in cases of

cite the provision more than in passing is Britannia Holdings Ltd. v. Greer, 127 Wash. App. 926,
930–31, 113 P.3d 1041, 1043 (2005) (applying section 17 to a judgment for contract breach
between two individual litigants). The last time the Washington State Supreme Court cited this
provision was in State v. Curry, 118 Wash. 2d 911, 918, 829 P.2d 166, 169 (1992) (remarking
offhandedly that the provision would likely prohibit imprisoning individuals for being unable to pay
their debts).
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absconding debtors.140
This provision has not changed since its adoption at the Washington
Constitutional Convention in 1889.141 On its face, it appears to be
absolute: No person may be imprisoned for debt unless he or she is
absconding. “An absconding debtor is one who leaves, or is about to
leave, the jurisdiction, or who conceals himself within the jurisdiction,
for the purpose of avoiding the process of the courts . . . .”142 Facially,
article I, section 17 requires that absolutely no person be imprisoned for
failing to pay a debt unless that person is fleeing from his creditors.143
This Comment addresses only non-absconding LFO debtors—
individuals who have not tried to flee the state’s jurisdiction or conceal
themselves in order to avoid paying their LFO debt. The systemic
challenge to the LFO system levied by this Comment pertains to those
“honest but unfortunate” individuals who remain in the state and
cannot—or have chosen not to—make payments on their LFO
obligations. Likely, the vast majority of imprisoned LFO debtors are
non-absconding.144 To the extent the current system risks imprisoning
non-absconding LFO debtors, it is unconstitutional. A system that no
longer risks imprisoning non-absconding individuals—such as a
garnishment-based system allowing imprisonment only after the
individual flees or hides from valid garnishment—would not offend
article I, section 17.
1.

Imprisoning People for Failing to Pay Is “Imprisonment” Within
Article I, Section 17

By using contempt proceedings to imprison individuals for failing to
pay LFOs, Washington is imprisoning non-absconding individuals for
debt, violating the unambiguous plain language of article I, section 17.
Under the conventional approach to constitutional interpretation in
Washington, this should be the end of the matter:
[I]t is a cardinal rule of construction that the language of a state
140. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 17.
141. Compare WASH. CONST. art. I, § 17 (1889), with WASH. CONST. art. I, § 17.
142. Burrichter v. Cline, 3 Wash. 135, 136, 28 P. 367, 368 (1891).
143. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 490 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “absconding debtor” as “[a]
debtor who flees from creditors to avoid having to pay a debt”).
144. As the vast majority of imprisoned LFO debtors are low-income, many could not flee the
state to avoid their obligations even if they wished to do so. See BECKETT ET AL., supra note 2, at
27–41 (examining the financial and social consequences of LFOs in Washington); COLEMAN, supra
note 36, at 255 (noting that historically, honest but unfortunate, non-absconding debtors were
imprisoned while the rogues went free).
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Constitution, more than that of any other of the written laws, is
to be taken in its general and ordinary sense. The reason for the
rule lies in the fact that its makers are the people who adopt
it. . . . “Every word employed in the Constitution is to be
expounded in its plain, obvious, and common sense, unless the
context furnishes some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge
it.”145
Contrary to the plain language of its provision, Washington is
imprisoning non-absconding individuals.
2.

Non-Fine LFOs Are “Debts” Within Article I, Section 17

The question then becomes: What, if any, LFOs constitute “debts”
within the meaning of the Constitution? The word “debt” is a broad term
and should be determined in its “popular and general sense,”
encompassing all “obligations due from one person to another of every
character.”146 Debt is a “specific sum of money due by agreement or
otherwise.”147 Thus, article I, section 17 prohibits imprisoning a debtor
for failing to pay obligations due to another person or entity of “every
character.” The provision does not apply to unpaid fines,148 taxes, or
license fees.149
A substantial amount of LFOs—what this Comment calls “non-fine
LFOs”—do not constitute fines, taxes, or license fees, thus falling within
the purview of article I, section 17. Such LFOs include court-appointed
attorneys’ fees,150 restitution,151 costs of defense,152 confinement costs,153
the cost of guilty convictions or pleas,154 deferred prosecution costs,155
costs of a warrant for failing to appear,156 pretrial supervision fees,157
145. Bronson v. Syverson, 88 Wash. 264, 275, 152 P. 1039, 1043 (1915) (quoting 1 JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 451 (1891)).
146. Id. at 277, 152 P. at 1044.
147. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 488 (10th ed. 2014).
148. BEVERLY PAULIK ROSENOW, THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 1889, at 507 (Quentin Shipley Smith ed., 1999).
149. Austin v. City of Seattle, 176 Wash. 654, 660–62, 30 P.2d 646, 648–49 (1934).
150. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(30) (2014).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. § 9.94A.760(2) (imposing providing $50 per day for incarceration in prison and up to
$100 per day for incarceration in county jail).
154. Id. § 36.18.020(2)(h) (imposing a cost of $200).
155. Id. § 10.01.160(2) (imposing a cost up to $250).
156. Id. (imposing a cost up to $100).
157. Id. (imposing a cost up to $150).
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jury costs,158 extradition costs,159 electronic monitoring,160 emergency
response costs,161 crime laboratory analysis fees,162 biological sample
collection fees,163 costs of interlocal drug funds,164 and “any other
financial obligation that is assessed to the offender as a result of a felony
conviction.”165 These are all obligations due from one (the offender) to
another (the government, or in the case of restitution, the victim), thus
constituting “debts” within the provision.
In addition to excluding fines, taxes, and license fees, article I, section
17 prohibits imprisonment only for civil debts.166 However, non-fine
LFOs are civil debts. The Washington State Supreme Court
characterizes Washington’s statute allowing imprisonment for LFO
nonpayment as civil in nature.167 Thus, non-fine LFOs are civil debts
within article I, section 17 and the provision should prohibit imprisoning
individuals for LFO default.
However, one Washington State Supreme Court case holds, at least in
part, that LFOs do not fall within the protections embodied by article I,
section 17. In upholding imprisonment for willful failure to pay court
ordered public defenders’ fees, the Court in State v. Barklind168
explained that probation orders did not constitute a “debt” under article
I, section 17.169 “A debt is created only in the sense that the order
required defendant to repay society for a part of what it lost as a result of
his commission of a crime.”170 At first glance, this seems to settle the
issue: LFOs (at least court-ordered public defender fees) fall outside of
the constitutional prohibition on imprisonment for debt.
However, the Barklind Court cited only one case in support of its key
proposition: Decker v. Decker,171 which held as a matter of public policy

158. Id. § 36.18.016(3)(b) ($125 for six-person juries, $250 for twelve-person juries).
159. Id. § 9.95.210(2).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. § 43.43.690(1) (imposing a mandatory fee of $100 for each offense).
163. Id. § 43.43.7541 (imposing a mandatory fee of $100 for each sentence imposed).
164. Id. § 9.94A.030(30).
165. Id.
166. ROSENOW, supra note 148, at 507 (noting the sponsor of article I, section 17’s explanation to
the delegation that the provision would only apply to civil debts).
167. Smith v. Whatcom Cnty. Dist. Ct., 147 Wash. 2d 98, 105, 52 P.3d 485, 489 (2002).
168. 87 Wash. 2d 814, 557 P.2d 314 (1976).
169. Id. at 819–20, 557 P.2d at 318–19.
170. Id. at 820, 557 P.2d at 319.
171. 52 Wash. 2d 456, 326 P.2d 332 (1958).
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that familial support obligations are not “debts.”172 The Barklind Court’s
unwavering reliance on Decker is problematic for two reasons. First,
imprisonment for failing to satisfy family support obligations is itself
facing criticism.173 Second, debts to society arising from the commission
of a crime and debts arising from familial responsibilities are readily
distinguishable. Society has long recognized a fundamental obligation to
protect one’s family.174 Courts need the power to imprison individuals
for defaulting on family support obligations to ensure dependents are
supported and to ensure family conflicts are expediently settled.175
Failing to support one’s family “involves considerably more than the
mere fact of noncompliance with a court order. It prompts considerations
other than the matter of an affront to the dignity of the court.”176
Fueling the relatively new offender-funded model of criminal justice
is not a fundamental obligation. Assessing LFOs, not to mention
imprisoning LFO debtors for default, is a relatively recent
phenomenon,177 while the obligation to support one’s family is
timeless.178 Imprisonment for LFO nonpayment is not a “fundamental”
obligation as was contemplated by Decker, calling Barklind’s holding
into question.
172. Barklind, 87 Wash. 2d at 820, 557 P.2d at 319 (citing Decker, 52 Wash. 2d at 458, 326 P.2d
at 333).
173. See, e.g., Ann Cammett, Shadow Citizens: Felony Disenfranchisement and the
Criminalization of Debt, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 349, 384–86 (2012). This argument is outside of the
scope of this Comment.
174. For example, when drafting laws in the 1800s prohibiting imprisonment for debt, British
Parliament maintained exceptions that allowed imprisonment for family support debts. Ware, supra
note 35, at 362. This sentiment is reflected in early American cases. See, e.g., Audubon v. Shufeldt,
181 U.S. 575, 577 (1901) (finding the payment of alimony to be a fundamental duty of the husband
to support his wife); Andrew v. Andrew, 20 A. 817, 819 (1890) (declaring familial support debts to
arise out of a fundamental duty of a man to support his wife and children); State v. King, 22 So.
887, 889 (La. 1897) (calling familial support debts “of paramount importance to the welfare of
society”). Each of these cases were cited favorably by the Washington Supreme Court in In Re
Cave, 26 Wash. 213, 216, 66 P. 425, 427 (1901). The sentiment continues to be expressed in more
modern Washington opinions. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 96 Wash. 2d 255, 262–63, 634 P.2d
877, 881 (1981) (discussing a child’s right to support as fundamental, longstanding, and “of greatest
concern” to the state and court).
175. Decker, 52 Wash. 2d at 458, 326 P.2d at 333.
176. Id. at 458, 326 P.2d at 333.
177. See Shapiro, supra note 5. Governments began adopting “tough-on-crime” policies in 1970.
Id. As a result, costs of criminal justice systems increased eleven-fold from 1970–2000. Id.
Struggling with budget deficits and pressure to avoid increasing taxes, legislatures began charging
defendants “user fees,” which also increased over time. Id.
178. For example, when limiting imprisonment for debt, Parliament consistently articulated
family obligations as outside of any prohibitions, but did nothing to exempt debts owed to the state
for costs related to prosecution or incarceration. See supra notes 53–54.
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But, could it be that LFOs, like every debt owed to the government,
are “fundamental” simply because they are owed to the public as a
whole? No. Throughout most of Washington’s jurisprudence, the only
financial obligations not protected from imprisonment were unpaid
fines,179 taxes, and license fees.180 All other debts owed to the
government, including costs and ordinary fees, were and are well within
the purview of Washington’s and other states’ constitutional prohibitions
on imprisonment for debt.181 The word “debt” should be used in its
“popular and general sense”—requiring recognition of its
capaciousness.182 “Obviously, it seems to us, [debt] was understood to
signify obligations due from one person to another of every
character.”183 The current Court should respect the breadth of the term
“debt” and not allow the faulty status obligation reasoning underlying
Barklind to work around the fundamental protection from imprisonment
for debt.184
Non-fine LFOs should be treated as “debts” under article I, section
17. The question then becomes whether imprisonment for LFO
nonpayment constitutes “imprisonment for debt.” If not for the case law
interpreting this provision divergently,185 the answer would be a clear
and simple “yes”: Non-fine LFOs are debts within article I, section 17
and imprisonment for debt is facially unconstitutional unless a debtor is
absconding.186 Although the constitution’s plain language makes no
exception for LFO debts, non-absconding individuals are imprisoned for
LFO default. Before discussing the case law abrogating this seemingly
logical analysis, it is necessary to first understand the ideals embodied in
179. ROSENOW, supra note 148, at 507.
180. Austin v. City of Seattle, 176 Wash. 654, 660–62, 30 P.2d 646, 648–49 (1934).
181. State v. McFarland, 60 Wash. 98, 110 P. 792 (1910) (holding that article I, section 17
protected the individual from being imprisoned for failing to pay an innkeeper fee); see 16A C.J.S.
Constitutional Law § 710 (2005).
182. Bronson v. Syverson, 88 Wash. 264, 277, 152 P. 1039, 1044 (1915).
183. Id. at 277–78, 152 P. at 1044.
184. James, supra note 31, at 157 (“Courts and the federal government may attempt to put a new
face on the old problem of debtors’ prisons by calling child support a ‘social obligation’ or by
calling court orders ‘decrees’ rather than ‘debts,’ but if an individual is incarcerated for failure to
pay money owed, then that individual is in a debtor’s prison.”).
185. See infra notes 245–95 and accompanying text.
186. See Bronson, 88 Wash. at 277, 152 P. at 1044 (“[Article I, section 17] is a simple declaration
that there shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases of absconding debtors. Nothing in the
context or subject-matter indicates that it is otherwise limited, nor do we find elsewhere in the
Constitution anything that indicates that it was intended to be otherwise limited.”); Burrichter v.
Cline, 3 Wash. 135, 28 P. 367 (1891) (holding that arrest for failing to pay a private debt when the
debtor was not absconding violated article I, section 17).
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article I, section 17. These ideals reinforce the plain language
interpretation discussed above while providing a foundation necessary to
understand the provision’s interpretive jurisprudence.
B.

Imprisonment for Failing to Pay LFOs Is Contrary to the Populist
Ideals Embodied in the Washington State Constitution and Article
I, Section 17

The Washington Constitution’s article I, section 17’s plain language
makes no exception for LFO default and the purpose and policy
embodied in the provision, as well as the history underlying its
enactment, runs contrary to finding an implied exception. Washington’s
article I, section 17 strongly protects individual liberties, exceeding the
protection provided by many other state provisions.187 As with much of
the Washington Constitution’s bill of rights, article I, section 17 is a
provision espousing populist ideals188 and must be interpreted with a
mind for its unusual strength and an eye towards protecting individual
liberties from State infringement.189 Reading “debt” to exclude LFOs
grants the government an implied right to meddle in personal affairs and
fails to respect the populist ideals espoused in Washington’s
Constitution.
Washington’s bill of rights is robust, encompassing the values of the
populist movement prevalent during the time of the framing.190
Occupying a large majority of Washington Territory politics, the
populist movement emphasized individual liberties, focusing on limiting
the state’s ability to exercise its power on individual citizens.191
Concerned about special interests controlling government, as well as
power concentrations in the economically elite, the delegates crafted a
constitution that strongly protected the working class’ personal
liberties.192 Although some provisions have changed, the Washington
Constitution still prioritizes individual liberties, respecting the populist
187. Although most constitutional prohibitions on imprisonment for debt only apply to debts
arising out of contract, 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 711 (2005), Washington’s provision also
applies to debts arising from tort judgments. Bronson, 88 Wash. at 277–79, 152 P. at 244.
188. See Hugh Spitzer, The Past and Present Populist State, in THE CONSTITUTIONALISM OF
AMERICAN STATES 771, 777 (George E. Connor & Christopher W. Hammons eds., 2008).
189. See id. at 771 (“[T]he sensibilities, concerns, and ideology entrenched in an original
constitution continuously influence court interpretations of that document.”).
190. See id. (“Washington’s 1889 Constitution was, and remains, overwhelmingly ‘populist’ in
its orientation, content, and practical effect.”).
191. Id. at 777.
192. Id. at 772.
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sentiment so pervasive in 1889.193 Interpreting article I, section 17 to
respect its populist roots would limit the state’s powers to infringe on
individual liberties to only those expressly allowed by the provision.
Information regarding the 1889 convention suggests the delegates
quickly passed article I, section 17 after only minor alteration.194 This
quick passage combined with a lack of recorded debate suggests there
was little disagreement, further implying that the drafters intended the
provision to be consistent with the underlying principles defining the
populist movement and the political ideals of the delegates.195
State constitutions routinely borrow provisions from other states.196
The Washington delegates’ intentional deviations from other states’
provisions, particularly those that come from “sister states,” evince what
each provision was intended to mean.197 Because the transcript of the
Washington constitutional convention has potentially been destroyed, it
is unclear from where article I, section 17 was derived.198 However, the
provision is nearly identical to a draft authored by W. Lair Hill
submitted to the 1889 convention: “There shall be no imprisonment for
debt, except in cases of debt and absconding debtors.”199 Hill likely
derived his provision from the Oregon Constitution, which provides:
“There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in case of fraud or
absconding debtors.”200
Article I, section 17, while reflecting the flavor of these two
provisions, mirrors neither of them identically.201 The minor divergences
193. Id. (“The state’s anti-special-interest constitution has not changed appreciably during the
past century.”).
194. ROSENOW, supra note 148, at 507.
195. See Spitzer, supra note 188, at 772–73 (discussing the populist movement pervasive at the
time in the minds of the Washington delegates and citizens).
196. See G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1169, 1190–91
(1992) (calling state constitutional drafters more likely “borrowers—at times, unabashed
plagiarists—than creators”).
197. Id.
198. ROSENOW, supra note 148, at vii.
199. W. LAIR HILL, A CONSTITUTION ADAPTED TO THE COMING STATE: SUGGESTIONS BY HON.
W. LAIR HILL: MAIN FEATURES CONSIDERED IN LIGHT OF MODERN EXPERIENCE 21 (1889).
200. OR. CONST. art. I, § 19 (1859). Due to Washington’s close ties with Oregon, and the fact
that W. Lair Hill hailed from Oregon, much of Washington’s Constitution was derived from
Oregon’s. ROSENOW, supra note 148, at 506 n.27. Oregon’s constitutional prohibition on
imprisonment for debt was likely derived from Indiana’s but the delegation substantially altered the
language of the Indiana provision, creating a much more succinct and robust prohibition. See also
Claudia Burton & Andrew Grade, A Legislative History of the Oregon Constitution of 1857—Part I,
37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 469, 484, 530–32 (2001); IND. CONST. art. I, § 22.
201. Compare WASH. CONST. art. I, § 17, with OR. CONST. art. I, § 19. See also HILL, supra note
199, at 21 (1889). Twenty years after the constitutional convention, the Washington State Supreme
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serve only to make Washington’s provision more robust. By removing
the second “debt” in W. Lair Hill’s draft, the delegates narrowed cases in
which debtors could be imprisoned by articulating an unambiguous bar
unless the debtor was absconding.202 Similarly, if the delegates began
with the Oregon version then removed “fraud,” they eliminated a
potentially broad exception, codifying their intent to allow imprisonment
only when the debtor was absconding. The delegates intended this
provision to be powerful: Although most provisions apply only to
contractual debts,203 for nearly one hundred years, article I, section 17
has applied more broadly, encompassing judgments in tort.204
* * *
It is at worst unclear whether article I, section 17 protects from
imprisonment for LFO default. “[I]mprisonment for debt is not favored,
and in the enforcement of the constitutional guaranty, every doubt
should be resolved in favor of the liberty of the citizen.”205 Accordingly,
the Washington State Supreme Court should interpret the prohibition on
imprisonment for debt broadly to protect citizens from imprisonment for
LFO default—resolving every doubt in favor of Washingtonians’
personal liberty. Furthermore, imprisonment for LFO default runs
contrary to populist ideals. “It is elementary that personal liberty
transcends the obligation to pay a monetary sum in most
circumstances.”206 As one early Washington State Supreme Court
explained:
Imprisonment for debt is abhorrent to the spirit of free
government, and is not to be tolerated under the form of penal
statutes. That no man shall oppress his debtor or restrain him of
his liberty has come to be a fixed principle, cherished by the

Court interpreted article I, section 17 to allow imprisonment for fraud. In re Milecke, 52 Wash. 312,
100 P. 743 (1909). This could imply that Washington’s provision was intended to be functionally
identical to Oregon’s. However, the Court’s holding did not rest on an argument that Washington
delegates intended the provision to be read narrowly or to impliedly include an exception for fraud.
Instead, the court explained that the case was essentially a criminal issuethe individual could be
imprisoned because of his criminal action: partaking in the comforts of an inn with the intent to
defraud. Id. at 317, 100 P. at 744–45; see infra Part V.C.1. That the provision was functionally
revised by the Court twenty years after the constitution was ratified does not refute the argument
that article I, section 17 was intended by the delegates to be a strong and broad prohibition.
202. See HILL, supra note 199.
203. 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 711 (2005).
204. Bronson v. Syverson, 88 Wash. 264, 277–79, 152 P. 1039, 1044 (1915).
205. 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 710 (2005).
206. State v. Barklind, 87 Wash. 2d 814, 819, 557 P.2d 314, 318 (1976) (citing In re Milecke, 52
Wash. 312, 100 P. 743 (1909)).
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people, and so guarded by constitutional provisions that the
Legislature cannot give ear to those who seek to use the power
of the state to coerce the payment of their debts.207
Using contempt proceedings to avoid article I, section 17 nullifies the
provision’s plain language and the laudable populist goals it espouses208
and puts a creative slant on an expressly unconstitutional practice. Yet
litigants are not using article I, section 17 to combat the current
system.209 Why aren’t advocates utilizing this provision to challenge
potentially egregious violations of a constitutional liberty? The answer
likely lies in the evolution of article I, section 17’s jurisprudence.
C.

Case Law Has Abrogated the Constitutional Provision’s Power to
Protect Individuals From Imprisonment for Debt

In construing article I, section 17 the Washington State Supreme
Court has significantly diverged from the provision’s text and sentiment.
This Comment explains that divergence by separating the jurisprudence
into three distinct eras. Although the Court began by robustly protecting
the liberties expounded in article I, section 17 in the First Era, it
gradually eroded individual rights, carving out an exception for family
support obligations in the Second Era and qualifying the provision,
predicating prohibition on the nature or intent of imprisonment. This
corrosion has snowballed in the Third Era, rendering article I, section 17
into a mere shell of the protection embodied by the unambiguous text.
1.

In the First Era, the Court Robustly Protected the Prohibition on
Imprisonment for Debt

In Washington’s infancy, the Court focused primarily on the
distinction between punishing criminal intent and coercing payment. In
each case implicating article I, section 17, the Court condemned
imprisonment for defaulting on a civil debt.210 Instead, the Court allowed
207. Milecke, 52 Wash. at 315, 100 P. at 744.
208. See supra notes 140–204 and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., Cavnar v. Bounceback, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-00235-RMP, 2015 WL 4429095 (E.D.
Wash. July 18, 2014) (consumer protection laws); Rucker v. Spokane Cty., No. CV-12-5157-LRS,
slip op. at *6 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 26, 2013) (due process); State v. Blazina, 182 Wash. 2d 82, 344
P.3d 680 (2015) (due process); State v. Nason, 168 Wash. 2d 936, 948, 233 P.3d 848, 853 (2010)
(due process); State v. Nash, No. 38514-7-II, 2011 WL 198695, at *1, *3–4 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 6,
2011);. In fact, one scholar even suggests that it is unlikely the current practice of incarceration for
failing to pay LFOs can be constrained by article I, section 17. Giessen, supra note 80, at 551 n.32.
210. See, e.g., Bronson v. Syverson, 88 Wash. 264, 286, 152 P. 1039, 1046 (1915) (refusing to
imprison an individual for defaulting on a civil judgment); State v. McFarland, 60 Wash. 98, 104–
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imprisonment only when used to penalize criminal or fraudulent
action.211 These early Washington State Supreme Court opinions suggest
the strong language and populist ideals espoused in the article I, section
17 indicate that the drafters intended a robust protection.
Burrichter v. Cline212 is one of the earliest opinions construing article
I, section 17. Written two years after the Washington constitutional
convention and signed by leading delegates,213 the opinion considered a
debtor’s arrest for failing to pay a private obligation.214 Finding
insufficient evidence that the individual had attempted to abscond, the
Court found that jailing him was “illegal and improvident” under article
I, section 17.215 The Court took the constitutional provision at its word:
Imprisonment for debt is per se unconstitutional unless the debtor is
absconding.216
The Court first explained that the provision did not apply to punitive
fines in Colby v. Backus.217 In Colby, the Court examined a statute
allowing judges to impose the costs of criminal prosecution upon an
individual bringing a frivolous complaint and imprison the complainant
until the fine was paid.218 Characterizing the fine as a criminal penalty
and thus not as civil debt, the Court found that imprisonment would not
violate the Constitution.219
The Court first diverged from its respectful deference to the
provision’s unequivocal language in In re Milecke,220 a case that dealt

05, 110 P. 792, 794 (1910) (refusing to imprison an individual for failing to pay inspection fees);
Burrichter v. Cline, 3 Wash. 135, 136–37, 28 P. 367, 368 (1891) (refusing to imprison a nonabsconding individual for failing to pay a private debt).
211. In re Milecke, 52 Wash. 312, 317, 100 P. 743, 743–44 (1909) (allowing imprisonment for
using false pretenses to obtain food and lodging from an inn without payment); Colby v. Backus, 19
Wash. 347, 348–49, 53 P. 367, 367–68 (1898) (allowing imprisonment for failing to pay a criminal
fine assessed for engaging in frivolous prosecution).
212. 3 Wash. 135, 28 P. 367 (1891).
213. The opinion was authored by Justice Theodore Stiles, a delegate. ROSENOW, supra note 147,
at 485. The opinion was also signed by Justice Hoyt, the president of the constitutional convention.
Id. at 465.
214. Burrichter, 3 Wash. at 136–37, 28 P. at 368.
215. Id. at 136, 28 P. at 368.
216. Id.
217. 19 Wash. 347, 53 P. 367 (1898).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 349, 53 P. at 367 (“These costs are cast upon him as a penalty. They do not constitute
strictly and simply a debtin the technical sense of the wordany more than the fine imposed
upon a party convicted of assault and battery, is a debt.” (quoting In re Ebenhack, 17 Kan. 618
(1877))).
220. 52 Wash. 312, 100 P. 743 (1909).
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with a statute authorizing imprisonment of any individual who, using
false pretenses, obtained food or lodging from a boarding house without
payment.221 Although the court admitted article I, section 17 only
mentions absconding debtors and makes no express exemptions for
fraud, the Court decided that imprisonment for fraudulent conduct
resulting in debt did not offend the Washington Constitution.222 The
Court’s decision turned on the character of the punishment: The
defendant was being punished for intentionally pursuing a course of
fraudulent conduct, not for accruing an unpaid debt.223 As in Colby, the
Court’s concern seems to hinge on the distinction between punishing
malicious intent and coercing payment. The Court also emphasized the
importance of the protection embodied in article I, section 17.224
Soon after deciding Milecke, the Court took the opportunity to further
emphasize article I, section 17’s importance. State v. McFarland225 held
unconstitutional a portion of a statute punishing innkeepers for refusing
to pay inspection fees.226 The Court reasoned that a statute providing
imprisonment for “a mere failure to pay” offended article I, section
17.227 Although the opinion is quite short, this decision, too, seems to
turn on the existence—or lack thereof—of malicious intent: “The only
alleged criminal offense, with the commission of which the appellant has
been charged, is that he did not pay the inspection fee. He cannot be
fined or imprisoned for any such act, as it cannot be made a criminal
offense.”228
The Court once again respected the clear language in article I, section
17 in Bronson v. Syverson.229 The defendant defaulted on a significant
civil judgment entered against him, causing the plaintiff to obtain a writ
of execution from the trial court mandating the defendant’s

221. Id. at 314, 100 P. at 744.
222. Id. at 315–16, 100 P. at 745.
223. Id. at 317, 100 P. at 745.
224. The Court stated:
Imprisonment for debt is abhorrent to the spirit of free government, and is not to be tolerated
under the form of penal statutes. That no man shall oppress his debtor or restrain him of his
liberty has come to be a fixed principle, cherished by the people, and so guarded by
constitutional provisions that the Legislature cannot give ear to those who seek to use the
power to the state to coerce the payment of their debts.
Id. at 315, 100 P. at 744.
225. 60 Wash. 98, 110 P. 792 (1910).
226. Id. at 99–101, 105, 110 P. at 792, 794.
227. Id. at 105, 110 P. at 794 (citing Hubbell v. Higgins, 126 N.W. 914, 918 (1910)).
228. Id.
229. 88 Wash. 264, 152 P. 1039 (1915).
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imprisonment.230 The defendant could be discharged only by satisfying
the judgment.231 Indicative of its respect for the clear wording of the
provision, the Court took a textual approach to construing article I,
section 17:
[I]t is a cardinal rule of construction that the language of a state
Constitution, more than that of any other of the written laws, is
to be taken in its general and ordinary sense . . . . “Every word
employed in the Constitution is to be expounded in its plain,
obvious, and common sense, unless the context furnishes some
ground to control, qualify, or enlarge it.”232
Thus, the Court held, except in cases of absconding debtors, the
Constitution, by its plain meaning, absolutely barred imprisonment for
civil debts.233 On that ground, the Court refused to uphold the
defendant’s imprisonment, even though he had failed to comply with a
court-ordered judgment.234
When one examines these cases together, a foundational
interpretation of article I, section 17 begins to emerge. In Milecke,
imprisonment for fraudulently failing to pay for food and lodging at an
inn did not violate the prohibition on imprisonment for debt.235 The debt
was arguably incidental to the defendant’s wrongdoing—it was the
fraudulent act that offended the Court. In contrast, McFarland held that
imprisonment for failing to pay an innkeeper fee was unconstitutional.236
The Court explained that, absent a finding of fraud in incurring the debt
in the first place, imprisonment violated article I, section 17.237 The
Legislature could mandate payment, but it could not mandate
imprisonment for failing to pay absent a finding of fraud.238 In Bronson,
the court held that an individual could not be imprisoned for failing to
pay a court ordered judgment.239 Because the debtor’s ability to obtain
230. Id. at 264–65, 152 P. at 1039.
231. Id. at 269, 152 P. at 1041.
232. Id. at 275, 152 P. at 1043 (quoting 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES § 451 (1891)).
233. Id. at 277, 152 P. at 1043 (“[Article I, section 17] is a simple declaration that there shall be
no imprisonment for debt except in cases of absconding debtors. Nothing in the context or subjectmatter indicates that it is otherwise limited, nor do we find elsewhere in the constitution anything
that indicates that it was intended to be otherwise limited.”).
234. 88 Wash. at 284, 152 P. at 1046.
235. 52 Wash. 312, 316–17, 100 P. 743, 744–75 (1909).
236. State v. McFarland, 60 Wash. 98, 104, 110 P. 792, 794 (1910).
237. Id. at 104–05, 110 P. at 794.
238. Id.
239. Bronson, 88 Wash. at 283–84, 152 P. at 1046.
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freedom was predicated on his payment of the debt, the Constitution had
been violated.240
The crux of the reasoning underlying these cases is this: An
individual could not avoid imprisonment for a criminal or fraudulent act
just because it resulted in a debt.241 In cases where the court allowed
imprisonment, the fraud or criminal act created the debt.242 The fraud or
criminal act itself was not the mere nonpayment of a pre-existing debt.243
Defendants could be penalized for the initial criminal or fraudulent act
notwithstanding article I, section 17. But, if the fraudulent or criminal
act was mere nonpayment of a pre-existing debt, the individual could not
be imprisoned unless they were absconding.244
Nearly all of the Court’s opinions during the First Era respected the
strong language of article I, section 17. However, during this time the
Court also provided the foundation for an implied exception—what this
Comment will call the family support obligation exception. In re Cave245
gave short shrift to an argument that jailing the defendant for unpaid
alimony246 was imprisonment for debt247 by holding that alimony is not
“debt” under article I, section 17.248 The Court relied on “well-settled
law” declaring alimony to be something other than a debt, citing only
240. Id. at 269–70, 152 P. at 1041.
241. In re Milecke, 52 Wash. at 317, 100 P. at 745 (“The offense consists, not in the creation of a
debt, nor in its nonpayment, but rather in the fraud through which credit may be procured or
payment evaded. The latter, and not the former, is the thing for which punishment is to be inflicted.”
(quoting State v. Yardley, 32 S.W. 481, 484 (Tenn. 1895))).
242. See, e.g., id.
243. See, e.g., id.
244. Burrichter et al. v. Cline, 3 Wash. 135, 28 P. 367 (1891) (noting that an individual may not
be imprisoned for failing to pay a debt unless they are found by the court to be absconding).
245. 26 Wash. 213, 66 P. 425 (1901).
246. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 89 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “alimony” as court ordered support
for one’s separated spouse).
247. In re Cave, 26 Wash. at 216, 66 P. at 426 (dedicating only forty words of actual text to
dismissing the argument).
248. Id. Although the holding of this case is clear and concise, predicated entirely on cases
focusing on the fundamental nature of family support obligations, the Court later attempted to
retroactively revise the holding:
[T]he real ground of the decision is that imprisonment can be used as a means of coercing the
performance of the order of the court; to compel the defendant to do a thing which was in his
power to do; not as a punishment for a failure to satisfy a judgment of alimony which he had
no means of satisfying.
Bronson v. Syverson, 88 Wash. 264, 272, 152 P. 1039, 1042 (1915). The Court did not cite any
portion of Cave to support this assertion. The Washington State Court of Appeals later used this
characterization in Britannia Holdings Ltd. v. Greer, 127 Wash. App. 926, 931, 113 P.3d 1041,
1044 (2005), to find imprisonment for failing to pay a contractual debt would not offend article I,
section 17 as long as the court found the default was willful. Id. at 934, 113 P.3d at 1045.
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cases from the federal courts249 and state courts in Illinois,250 Vermont,251
and Louisiana.252 Each case cited by the Court predicated its holding on
the fundamental duty of the husband to support his wife.253 The Court
did not significantly revisit its holding until nearly fifty years later.254
When examined in tandem, Cave and the other foundational holdings
can be boiled down to a simple two-step test: (1) is this a debt within
article I, section 17; and (2) if so, is this (a) imprisonment for failing to
pay a previously incurred debt (impermissible); or is it (b) punishing
fraudulent or criminal conduct that resulted in a debt (permissible)? This
test is compelling in its simplicity. Although this test can be recognized
driving the reasoning in many opinions, subsequent courts have unduly
complicated its application.
2.

In the Second Era, the Court Began Carving out an Exception for
Support Debts and Positing a Distinction Between Contempt and
Civil Default

During the Second Era, the Court began chipping away at the strong
prohibition on imprisonment for debt it had emphasized in Milecke and
its progeny, allowing imprisonment for failure to pay business and
occupations taxes255 and failure to pay debts imposed by divorce
249. Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575 (1901). This case examined whether alimony was
dischargeable under the current bankruptcy act. Id. at 576. The Court explained that alimony “is not
founded on contract, express or implied, but on the natural and legal duty of the husband to support
the wife.” Id. at 577. The Court held, “alimony cannot be regarded as a debt owing from the
husband to the wife, and, not being so, cannot be discharged by an order in the bankruptcy court.”
Id. at 580.
250. Barclay v. Barclay, 56 N.E. 636, 637 (Ill. 1900) (“The liability to pay alimony is not
founded upon a contract, but is a penalty imposed for a failure to perform a duty . . . . [A]limony
cannot be regarded as a debt owing from the husband to the wife.”).
251. Andrew v. Andrew, 20 A. 817, 819 (Vt. 1890) (“[The right to collect familial support debts]
grows out of the domestic relations of the parties. It is the duty of the husband to support the wife.
That duty does not cease upon the dissolution of the marriage for his misconduct. It is the duty of
the father to provide for his children. He is not relieved from that duty when their custody is given
to the mother.”).
252. State v. King, 22 So. 887, 889 (La. 1897) (“[Alimony obligations are,] in no sense of the
word, ‘debts’ due by the spouses; they are simply recognized legal duties, which it is of paramount
importance to the welfare of society . . . . An order for alimony in a divorce suit is nothing more
than the judicial sanction and enforcement . . . of the duty by the husband to support the wife.”).
253. See supra notes 249–52.
254. The Washington State Supreme Court continued to hold that alimony was not a “debt” under
the Constitution, see, e.g., Haakenson v. Coldiron, 190 Wash. 627, 629, 70 P.2d 294, 295 (1937),
but no robust opinion was provided until the late 1950s in Decker v. Decker, 52 Wash. 2d 456, 326
P.2d 332 (1958).
255. Austin v. City of Seattle, 176 Wash. 654, 30 P.2d 646 (1934).
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courts.256 These holdings provide the foundation upon which modern
courts rely when imprisoning individuals for LFO nonpayment. In
Austin v. City of Seattle,257 the Court considered a statute imprisoning
individuals for failing to pay the city’s business and occupations tax.258
Recognizing the factual similarities to McFarland, the Court attempted
to distinguish the two cases, arguing that in McFarland the statute
[D]id not make it unlawful to operate a hotel without paying the
inspection fee. Under the ordinance here involved, it is unlawful
to engage in the proscribed business without paying the tax and
obtaining a license. That is the very essence of the offense which
is made the subject of punishment.259
Imprisonment was not being used to coerce payment, it was instead
being used to punish noncompliance with the ordinance.260 At first, this
seems right in line with Milecke, which allowed punishment of
fraudulent conduct.261 However, Austin takes the Milekce reasoning a
step farther. In Milecke, an individual did not violate the statute unless
she used “false pretenses”—i.e. acted fraudulently.262 This emphasis on
fraud is supported by McFarland, which held unconstitutional a statute
that did not contain language limiting violations to fraudulent acts,
instead allowing imprisonment for “mere failure to pay.”263 The
ordinances involved in McFarland and Austin are functionally
indistinguishable: they both allow for imprisonment for failing to pay a
tax or fee, and both defendants were punished for violating the word of
law. Nonetheless, McFarland and Austin reached entirely different
results.
However, the Austin Court’s primary holding was that taxes and
license fees were not protected by article I, section 17.264 This Court’s
reasoning, which slightly tweaks the foundational two-step described
above, may be where the current jurisprudence allowing imprisonment
under the guise of contempt was born.
In the cases following Austin, the Court further compromised article I,
256. Decker, 52 Wash. 2d at 457, 326 P.2d at 332; Brantley v. Brantley, 54 Wash. 2d 717, 344
P.2d 731 (1959).
257. 176 Wash. 654, 30 P.2d 646 (1934).
258. Id. at 655–56, 30 P.2d at 647.
259. Id. at 661, 30 P.2d at 649.
260. Id.
261. See supra notes 220–24 and accompanying text.
262. In re Milecke, 52 Wash. 312, 317, 100 P. 743, 745 (1909).
263. State v. McFarland, 60 Wash. 98, 105, 110 P. 792, 794 (1910).
264. Austin, 176 Wash. at 660, 30 P.2d at 648.
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section 17. In Decker the defendant was imprisoned for failing to pay
community debts imposed on him by a court-ordered divorce decree.265
The Court first explained that because public policy supports expedient
settlement of divorce disputes, article I, section 17 did not apply to
family obligations.266 The Court briefly discussed contempt powers, but
it predicated its holding on an overarching concern regarding the
fundamental nature of family support obligations.267 Of course, this
decision was not without dissent, as three justices challenged the notion
that an individual could have the power to imprison their former spouse
for failing to pay a debt to a third party.268
Similarly, in Brantley v. Brantley,269 a divorce court ordered the
defendant to pay his marital community’s debts owed to third party
creditors.270 When he defaulted, he was imprisoned for contempt.271 The
court reached the same result obtained in Decker, again basing its
opinion entirely on the unique nature of family support debts:272
[T]he significant question to be determined is whether the
provision that the court seeks to enforce by contempt
proceedings, regardless of the name given it, bears a reasonable
relationship to the husband’s duty to support his wife and
265. 52 Wash. 2d 456, 457, 326 P.2d 332 (1958).
266. Id. at 458, 326 P.2d at 333.
267. Id. (stating that failing to comply with a court order “involves considerably more than the
mere fact of noncompliance with a court order. It prompts considerations other than the matter of an
affront to the dignity of the court—which in itself is serious enough” (emphasis added)).
268. Id. at 467–70, 326 P.2d at 338–39 (1958) (Mallery, J., dissenting).
269. 54 Wash. 2d 717, 344 P.2d 731 (1959).
270. Id. at 718, 344 P.2d at 732.
271. Id.
272. Unlike in Decker, the Brantley Court did not tie this analysis to the word “debt,” instead
arguing that the prohibition did not pertain to the equitable powers of divorce court. Brantley, 54
Wash. 2d at 719–20, 344 P.3d at 732–33. Thus, the Court was convinced that “Art. I, § 17, of our
constitution, simply was not designed to thwart or prevent a proper exercise of the equity power and
discretion of our divorce courts.” Id. at 719, 344 P.2d at 732–33 (emphasis added). At least one
court has embraced the unique reasoning in Brantley, attempting to extend it to include contempt in
all proceedings. State ex rel. Daly v. Snyder, 117 Wash. App. 602, 609–10, 72 P.3d 780, 783
(2003). However, the Snyder court was examining imprisonment for failing to pay child support
under article I, section 17. Id. at 604–05, 72 P.3d at 780–81. Family obligation debts are not within
the purview of the provision due to their unique fundamental nature and the court’s attempt to
extend the equitable decree argument should be limited to its facts. Subsequent courts have
generally not relied upon the “equitable decree” argument proffered by the Brantley court. Instead,
their holdings are predicated on either determining the obligation is not a debt, see, e.g., State v.
Barklind, 87 Wash. 2d 814, 820, 557 P.2d 314, 319 (1976), or articulating a distinction between
imprisoning an individual, not for owing a debt, but for failing to comply with a court order to pay a
pre-existing debt, see, e.g., id. at 819, 557 P.2d at 318; Britannia Holdings Ltd. v. Greer, 127 Wash.
App. 926, 932–33, 113 P.3d 1041, 1044 (2005).
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children. If it does, it does not fall within the constitutional
prohibition against imprisonment for debt.273
Even this holding—which was more clearly based on the unique nature
of family support debts than was Decker—was not without dissent:
It is not the prerogative of the court to change the universally
accepted meaning of the English language. We are here
concerned with an order for the payment of debts and an order
of imprisonment for contempt of court. . . .
....
I prefer the theory that the constitutional prohibition against
imprisonment for debt deprives the court of the power to make
any order respecting a debt if the contemplated method of
enforcement is by imprisonment.274
During the Second Era, the Court chipped away at the strong
protection provided by article I, section 17. However, it did not do so in
a coherent way. The clearest contribution made by these cases is that
“debt” under the Constitution does not include family support debts or
debts owed to third parties in connection with family support
obligations.275 Although the Court also attempted to distinguish between
punitive imprisonment for violating a statute or court order and coercive
imprisonment for failing to pay a debt,276 this distinction was contested
by justices both in dissent and majority.277 However, the arguably
extraneous278 contempt-versus-civil-debt analyses erected a platform off
273. Brantley, 54 Wash. 2d at 721, 344 P.2d at 734.
274. Id. at 54 Wash. 2d at 723, 344 P.2d at 734–35 (1959) (Mallery, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original).
275. Brantley, 54 Wash. 2d at 721, 344 P.2d at 734 (“[T]he significant question to be determined
is whether the provision that the court seeks to enforce by contempt proceedings, regardless of the
name given it, bears a reasonable relationship to the husband’s duty to support his wife and
children. If the [sic] does, it does not fall within the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment
for debt.”); Decker v. Decker, 52 Wash. 2d 456, 458, 326 P.2d 332, 333 (1958) (“It has been clear
in this state for over fifty years that arrearages in alimony and support payments do not constitute a
debt within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition.”); In re Cave, 26 Wash. 213, 216, 66 P.
425, 426 (1901) (“It is the well-settled law of this country that a decree or order for alimony in a
divorce proceeding is not a debt, within the meaning of that term as used in section 17 of article 1 of
our constitution.”).
276. See, e.g., Austin v. City of Seattle, 176 Wash. 654, 661–62, 30 P.2d 646, 649 (1934).
277. Brantley, 54 Wash. 2d at 721, 344 P.2d at 734 (1959) (seemingly rejecting the contemptversus-civil-debt distinction raised briefly in Decker by predicating its holding solely on the
equitable nature of family support debts).
278. In both Austin, 176 Wash. 654, 30 P.2d 646, and Decker, 52 Wash. 2d 456, 326 P.2d 332,
the contempt/ordinance violation versus civil debt distinction was a secondary discussion or
alternative holding. Austin, 176 Wash. at 660–62, 30 P.3d at 649 (holding that taxes and license fees
are not debts within the constitution, but then stating “the misdemeanor consists in a refusal to obey
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which future courts dove, rendering the provision a mere shell of the
protection set forth in the First Era.
3.

In the Third Era, the Court Expanded the Family Support Debt
and Fraud Exceptions Significantly, Further Debilitating Article I,
Section 17

In the 1970s, the United States began experiencing an unprecedented
crime wave and most states, including Washington, adopted a “tough on
crime” attitude and the “offender funded” model of criminal justice.279
Similarly, the Court took a tougher stance on offenders, failing to treat
the contempt-versus-civil-debt distinction as contested. In this third and
final era, the Court relied heavily on contempt proceedings to effectively
hamstring article I, section 17.
In Barklind, the Court held that, although it is “elementary that
personal liberty transcends the obligation to pay a monetary sum in most
circumstances,” a defendant could be jailed for willfully failing to pay
court ordered public defenders fees.280 The Court reasoned the defendant
was not jailed for owing the county, but was jailed for failing to comply
with a court order demanding payment.281
Lower courts did not necessarily endorse this hard-line approach to
imprisonment for debt. In State v. Enloe,282 the Washington State Court
of Appeals invalidated a statute allowing imprisonment for intentionally
failing to pay for agricultural products.283 Emphasizing that “[c]riminal
statutes involving a deprivation of liberty must be strictly construed
against the State,” the court endorsed the approach expounded by
Milecke and its progeny, explaining that fraud resulting in debt was an
imprisonable offense, while mere willful failure to pay was not.284
the provisions of the ordinance, and the fine authorized to be imposed upon conviction is not
intended as a payment of the license tax, but as a punishment for defying the commands of the
ordinance”); Decker, 52 Wash. 2d at 458–65, 326 P.2d at 333–37 (holding that alimony is not a
“debt” within article I, section 17, but then engaging in additional analysis discussing cases in nonfamilial-debt contexts). In each case, the Court could have settled the issue with only its first
holding: The obligations at issue (penalties and fines in Austin, familial debts in Decker) were not
“debts” within article I, section 17. Id. Given the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, there is an
argument that the Austin and Decker Courts should not have delved into any additional secondary or
alternative analyses.
279. See supra notes 68–71 and accompanying text.
280. 87 Wash. 2d 814, 819–20, 557 P.2d 314, 318–19 (1976).
281. Id.
282. 47 Wash. App. 165, 734 P.2d 520 (1987).
283. Id. at 166, 734 P.2d at 521.
284. Id. at 170–72, 734 P.2d at 523–24.
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Mirroring Enloe’s approach, the Washington State Supreme Court
also refused to imprison a defendant for taking his own vehicle from a
mechanic’s shop without paying for services.285 Absent proof of a
mechanic’s lien, taking the car was no more than defaulting on a
contractual debt and did not rise to the level of theft.286 Imprisonment
would thus violate article I, section 17.287 Finding that the statute did not
require fraud and thus offended the Constitution, the Court explained,
“[w]e are loath to turn the criminal justice system into a mechanism for
the collection of private debts . . . . Although it is acceptable to imprison
for fraud, one cannot be imprisoned merely for failure to pay a debt.”288
It is telling that that the Court took a lenient approach in this case, when
the offender-funded model of criminal justice was not implicated. The
stark contrast between Pike and Barklind demonstrates the influence that
Washington’s “tough on crime” attitude had on the Court and its article
I, section 17 jurisprudence.
The varied Washington State Supreme Court decisions interpreting
article I, section 17 have led the Washington State Courts of Appeals to
author at least two opinions pushing the boundaries of the contemptversus-civil-debt distinction. In State ex rel. Daly v. Snyder,289 the court
of appeals upheld imprisonment for failing to pay child support, even
after the child had reached adulthood.290 Relying on the contemptversus-civil-debt-distinction, the court emphasized that civil contempt
was not being used to punish, which would be improper, but was instead
being used to induce remedial behavior, which is permitted.291 This
seems to be an inverse approach to the contempt-versus-civil-debt
distinction examined by Barklind, which predicated valid imprisonment
on punishing bad behavior rather than compelling payment. Nonetheless,
because the litigants successfully framed the imprisonment as contempt,
jailing the defendant for failing to pay was constitutionally permissible.

285. State v. Pike, 118 Wash. 2d 585, 587–88, 826 P.2d 152, 153 (1992).
286. Id. at 595, 826 P.2d at 157.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. 117 Wash. App. 602, 72 P.3d 780 (2003).
290. State ex rel. Daly v. Snyder, 117 Wash. App. 602, 604–05, 610, 72 P.3d 780, 780–81, 783
(2003).
291. Id. at 606, 82 P.3d at 781 (citing In re Interests of M.B., 101 Wash. App. 425, 439, 3 P.3d
780 (2000) (“A coercive sanction is justified only on the theory that it will induce a specific act that
the court has the right to coerce . . . should it become clear that the civil sanction will not produce
the desired result, the justification for the civil sanction disappears. Further incarceration can be
justified as a punishment for disobeying the court’s orders, but only after a criminal proceeding.”).
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In Britannia Holdings Ltd. v. Greer,292 the Washington State Court of
Appeals examined a court order requiring the defendants pay their
private debt within four months or be jailed.293 Just as in Snyder, the
court rested its decision on the coercive nature of its use of contempt: “It
has long been settled . . . that coercive imprisonment for contumacious
refusal to obey a lawful order to pay money is not imprisonment for
debt.”294 “Where a court orders a party to deliver money or property in
supplemental proceedings and the party is able but refuses to comply, a
remedial contempt order imposing imprisonment does not violate the
constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt.”295 Mirroring
the federal due process analysis expounded in Bearden v. Georgia,296 the
Court held that, as long as an individual is able to pay, imprisonment for
failing to respect a court order mandating payment does not violate the
constitution.297
D.

Opinions Handed down in the Third Era Do Not Stand on Strong
Foundation

So, what does article I, section 17 stand for? If one accepts Third Era
opinions at face value, one must accept that the judiciary has rewritten
article I, section 17, departing both from its original text and purpose and
from the Court’s early interpretation. In essence, opinions handed down
in the Second and Third Eras have changed the provision from stating
“[t]here shall be no imprisonment for debt, except in cases of absconding
debtors”;298 to now read:
There shall be no imprisonment for debt, [unless the debt is a
familial support debt]299 [or a debt owed to third parties in

292. 127 Wash. App. 926, 113 P.3d 1041 (2005).
293. Id. at 928, 113 P.3d at 1042.
294. Id. at 931, 113 P.3d at 1043 (citing In re Cave, 26 Wash. 213, 216, 66 P. 425, 426 (1901));
see also Brantley v. Brantley, 54 Wash. 2d 717, 344 P.3d 731 (1959), Bronson v. Syverson, 88
Wash. 264, 272, 152 P. 1039, 1042 (1915).
295. Britannia Holdings Ltd., 127 Wash. App. at 933, 113 P.3d at 1044.
296. 461 U.S. 660 (1983) (holding that the federal Due Process Clause was violated when an
indigent individual was imprisoned for failing to pay without a finding that he was able to pay); see
also State v. Nason, 168 Wash. 2d 936, 948, 233 P.3d 848, 853 (2010) (holding that Spokane
County’s “auto-jail policy,” wherein offenders were automatically imprisoned for failing to pay
LFOs, violated federal due process because it did not require the court find that the defendant was
able to pay).
297. Britannia Holdings Ltd., 127 Wash. App. at 932, 113 P.3d at 1044.
298. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 17.
299. In re Cave, 26 Wash. 213, 216, 66 P. 425, 426 (1901) (emphasis added).
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connection with familial support,]300 except in cases of
absconding debtors [or in cases of debtors who are not
determined to be absconding but fail to comply with an order of
the court demanding payment of debt, as long as that court order
is punitive rather than coercive,]301 [or coercive rather than
punitive].302
Setting aside the blaring inconsistencies, the very fact that judicial
interpretation has substantially rewritten the provision is cause for
concern. The constitutional drafting process is unlike any other rule
promulgation in modern government.303 Constitutions serve as
overarching documents defining the validity of all governmental actions.
Failing to respect constitutional language and intent compromises the
judicial process, both by compromising respect for judges and by
undermining the certainty of individual liberty protections fundamental
to Washington constitutional jurisprudence. Absent constitutional
amendment, the Washington judiciary should respect the plain language
and original intent of article I, section 17.
So far, the judiciary has allowed article I, section 17 to be rendered
null regarding an entire class of civil debts—incapacitating it to such an
extent that most litigants challenging imprisonment for LFO
nonpayment do not even cite the provision. However, the Court can
remedy this injustice by embracing the sentiment and interpretation set
forth during the constitutional convention and in the First Era of article I,
section 17 jurisprudence.
1.

Washington’s Modern Jurisprudence Has Nearly Nullified the
Provision
The current jurisprudence has rendered article I, section 17 a shell of

300. Brantley v. Brantley, 54 Wash. 2d 717, 721, 113 P.3d 731, 734 (1959); Decker v. Decker, 52
Wash. 2d 456, 458, 326 P.2d 332, 333 (1958).
301. Austin v. City of Seattle, 176 Wash. 654, 661–62, 30 P.2d 646, 649 (1934) (holding that a
statute providing imprisonment did not violate article I, section 17 because it was punishing the
defendant for violating the statute rather than coercing the defendant to pay the license fee); Colby
v. Backus, 19 Wash. 347, 349, 53 P. 367, 367 (1898) (explaining that imprisonment for failing to
pay costs cast upon a defendant as a penalty did not offend the constitution);.
302. Britannia Holdings Ltd., 127 Wash. App. at. 931, 113 P.3d at 1043 (“It has long been
settled . . . that coercive imprisonment for contumacious refusal to obey a lawful order to pay
money is not imprisonment for debt.” (emphasis added)); State ex rel. Daly v. Snyder, 117 Wash.
App. 602, 606, 72 P.3d 780, 781 (2003) (“A coercive sanction is justified only on the theory that it
will induce a specific act that the court has the right to coerce . . . should it become clear that the
civil sanction will not produce the desired result, the justification for the civil sanction disappears.”).
303. See Bronson v. Syverson, 88 Wash. 264, 275, 152 P. 1039, 1043 (1915).
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its former self. Although the provision facially allows imprisonment for
debt only in cases of absconding debtors, courts have imprisoned many
for failing to pay various debts, even without finding the individual was
absconding—and even without finding the debtor fraudulently incurred
the debt by never intending to pay it. In the most extreme example,
article I, section 17 no longer protects non-absconding individuals from
imprisonment for failing to pay civil debts.304 So long as a debt is courtordered and the defendant, in the judge’s opinion, willfully fails to pay,
she can be imprisoned even if she is not absconding.305
If willful non-payment is truly the touchstone for article I, section 17,
then the provision provides no further protection than is required by the
state Due Process Clause. The Due Process Clause protects individuals
from imprisonment via contempt for failing to pay unless the court has
first determined that the default was willful.306 Britannia Holdings
imposes no further protections. The delegates cannot have intended
article I, section 17 to essentially mirror the state’s Due Process Clause.
“[A] constitutional protection cannot be bypassed by allowing it to exist
in form but letting it have no effect in function.”307 In order for the
provision to exist in both form and function, it must have been intended
to provide additional protections for individuals imprisoned for unpaid
civil debts. Thus, the current interpretation of article I, section 17 is
impermissible. The most recent decisions are based on a
misunderstanding of precedent and the provision itself. The Court must
understand where its predecessors improperly diverged in order to
remedy the current jurisprudence. Article I, section 17 cannot continue
to exist in form but not substance. “The Constitution deals with
substance, not shadows. Its inhibition was leveled at the thing, not the
name . . . . If the inhibition can be evaded by the form of the enactment,

304. Britannia Holdings Ltd., 127 Wash. App. at 933, 113 P.3d at 1044 (holding that imprisoning
defendants for failing to satisfy a court ordered judgment mandating payment to a private party did
not constitute imprisonment for debt).
305. Id. at 933, 113 P.3d at 1044 (requiring only that the court find the debtor is able but refuses
to pay in order to imprison that debtor for contempt). Although this case is the most extreme
example, it seems to be generally accepted as good law. Prominent Washington constitutional law
scholars have cited the case as an uncontroverted interpretation of the provision. See, e.g., ROBERT
F. UTTER & HUGH D. SPITZER, THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION 44 (2d ed. 2013).
306. The United States Supreme Court issued this seminal holding in Bearden v. Georgia, 461
U.S. 660 (1983). The Washington State Due Process Clause does not afford protections exceeding
the federal Due Process Clause. In re Dyer, 143 Wash. 2d 384, 394, 20 P.3d 907, 912 (2001) (en
banc) (“Washington’s Due Process Clause does not afford a broader due process protection than the
Fourteenth Amendment.”).
307. Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wash. 2d 636, 660, 771 P.2d 711, 724 (1989).
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its insertion in the fundamental law was a vain and futile proceeding.”308
2.

The Modern Cases Are Inconsistent with the Foundational
Interpretation of Article I, Section 17

The modern cases, employing the contempt-versus-civil-debt
distinction, fail to respect the analytical framework derived from the
foundational decisions in the First Era: (1) if the principal is a debt
within article I, section 17, then (2) imprisonment for failing to pay a
previously incurred debt is impermissible, but punishing fraudulent or
criminal conduct that resulted in a debt is allowed.309
Interestingly, the cases providing foundation for the contempt-versuscivil-debt distinction did so through extraneous or alternative holdings.
In Austin, the Court held that imprisonment for failing to pay the
business and occupations tax did not violate the Constitution because
taxes were not “debts” within the provision. The Court then set forth a
second holding: Because the imprisonment was intended to punish the
defendant for failing to comply with the ordinance rather than compel
payment of the license tax, it did not constitute imprisonment for debt.310
The Court could have limited its discussion to only one holding: Taxes
are not “debts” within the provision. However, by endorsing a separate
holding that alternatively characterizes the obligation as a debt and
allows imprisonment without finding fraud, the Court adopted reasoning
contrary to Milecke. Similarly, although the primary holding in Decker
was that alimony is not a “debt” within article I, section 17—and the
Court retroactively attempted to cabin the case to just this holding311—
Decker has been cited for the proposition that imprisonment for
contemptuous default, even absent a finding of fraud, does not offend
the constitution.312
One can dismiss the jurisprudential discrepancies if one accepts the
holdings predicated on defining “debt” as the only holding in each of
these cases, dismissing the extraneous contempt-versus-civil-debt
308. Id. at 655, 771 P.2d at 721 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106,
116, 110 P. 1020, 1023 (1910)).
309. See supra notes 235–54 and accompanying text.
310. Austin v. City of Seattle, 176 Wash. 654, 655, 661–62, 30 P.2d 646, 649 (1934).
311. Brantley v. Brantley, 54 Wash. 2d 717, 721, 344 P.3d 731, 734 (1959) (“It should be clear
from our holding in the Decker case that . . . the significant question to be determined is whether the
provision that the court seeks to enforce by contempt proceedings, regardless of the name given it,
bears a reasonable relationship to the husband’s duty to support his wife and children. If it does, it
does not fall within the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt.”).
312. State v. Barklind, 87 Wash. 2d 814, 820, 557 P.2d 314, 319 (1976).
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discussions. However, subsequent courts have embraced the extraneous
discussions expounded in these cases, holding contempt, even absent a
finding of fraud, to be outside of the constitutional prohibition on
imprisonment for debt.313 Apart from the determination of “willfulness”
required by the Due Process Clause, courts no longer determine if a
fraudulent or criminal act occurred.314 This doctrine, predicated on the
contempt-versus-civil-debt distinction, has been recently heralded as
well-established law.315
Every so often, a court recognizes the inconsistencies and attempts to
bring the doctrine back down to its basics. In Enloe, the court invalidated
a statute providing imprisonment for failing to pay, explaining that the
statute failed to imprison individuals for only fraudulent acts as required
by Milecke and its progeny.316 The Court explained that the mere finding
of intentionality is insufficient to satisfy the fraud requirement espoused
by the early foundational cases.317 Similarly, the Washington State
Supreme Court refused to imprison a man for taking his own car from a
mechanic without paying.318 The Court explained: “Although it is
acceptable to imprison for fraud, one cannot be imprisoned merely for
failure to pay a debt.”319 Courts can recognize the fundamental
wrongness embodied by the current jurisprudence, but it is up to litigants
to give courts the tools to unify the doctrine by returning to the
foundational interpretation of article I, section 17.
3.

Imprisonment for Failing to Pay Non-Fine LFOs Is Contrary to
the Court’s Early Jurisprudence
The foundational cases interpreting article I, section 17 provide a

313. State ex rel. Daly v. Snyder, 117 Wash. App. 602, 610, 72 P.3d 780, 783 (2003). The Court
did not address fraud. Id. Instead, the Court predicated the validity of imprisoning the defendant for
failing to pay child support on a nuanced distinction:
“[E]nforcement of equitable orders through the use of contempt is permitted because a
contempt order is an attempt by the court to compel the defendant to comply with the court’s
prior, lawful, equitable order. It is not imprisonment for a debt, but rather imprisonment for
refusing to comply with the court’s equitable order to do or not to do something.”
Id.; see also Britannia Holdings Ltd. v. Greer, 127 Wash. App. 926, 933, 113 P.3d 1041, 1044
(2005) (requiring only that the debtor be able to satisfy the debt to be imprisoned for default).
314. See, e.g., Britannia Holdings Ltd., 127 Wash. App. at 933, 113 P.3d at 1044.
315. Id. at 931, 113 P.3d at 1043 (“It has long been settled . . . that coercive imprisonment for
contumacious refusal to obey a lawful order to pay money is not imprisonment for debt.”).
316. 47 Wash. App. 165, 170–72, 734 P.2d 520, 523–24 (1987).
317. Id.
318. State v. Pike, 118 Wash. 2d 585, 826 P.2d 152 (1992).
319. Id. at 595, 826 P.2d at 157.
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simple test: (1) if the principal is a debt within the provision, then (2)
imprisonment for failing to pay a previously incurred debt is
impermissible, while punishing fraudulent or criminal conduct that
resulted in a debt is permissible.320 Defendants cannot use article I,
section 17 to avoid discipline for fraudulent and criminal acts merely
because they resulted in debt.321 However, the plaintiffs cannot obliterate
the constitutional protection by imprisoning individuals for failing to pay
previous debts, or even for accruing those debts absent a finding of
fraud.322
Non-fine LFOs are “debts” within article I, section 17.323
Furthermore, imprisonment for LFO default occurs well after the
individual incurs the debt, constituting imprisonment for failing to pay a
previously incurred debt. LFOs do not arise as a result of fraudulent or
criminal act creating a debt in the way contemplated by Milecke. No
finding of fraud is required when a defendant is imprisoned for
default.324 LFOs do not operate as penalties, the nonpayment of which
constitutes fraud—convicted felons pay their “penalties” in the form of
fines and jail time. Non-fine LFOs are designed to reimburse the State
and victims for monetary losses incurred due to the debtor’s bad actions
and conviction. Were this practice in existence one hundred years ago,
the Court would have surely declared it unconstitutional.325 Imprisoning
individuals for failing to pay LFOs is contrary to the foundational
doctrine interpreting article I, section 17 and should no longer be
endorsed by Washington courts.

320. See supra notes 235–54 and accompanying text.
321. See supra notes 235–54 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 235–54 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 146–86 and accompanying text.
324. See, e.g., Britannia Holdings Ltd. v. Greer, 127 Wash. App. 926, 933, 113 P.3d 1041, 1044
(2005) (requiring only that the debtor be able to satisfy the debt to be imprisoned for default).
325. In Milecke, the court emphasized the difference between “unfortunate debtors” (protected
from imprisonment) and “wrongdoers”—such as a man who “beats his neighbor, kills his ox, or
girdles his fruit trees”—who could be imprisoned for his fraudulent actions. 52 Wash. 312, 316, 100
P. 743, 745 (1909). Individuals who beat their neighbor, kill their ox, or girdle fruit trees serve their
moral debt to society by paying fines and serving jail sentences. See id. LFOs are something else
altogether. They are designed to fund the criminal justice system and recoup losses caused to
victims; LFOs are not intended to punish: They primarily serve as a funding mechanism, levying a
debt against those who participate in the criminal justice system. See supra notes 68–74 and
accompanying text.
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THE STATUTORY SCHEME ENABLING IMPRISONMENT
FOR FAILING TO PAY LFO’S IS EXPRESSLY CONTRARY
TO WASHINGTON’S CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE

Not only does imprisonment for LFO nonpayment violate article I,
section 17, but the character of the statutes endorsing the practice
compromises its legality. Statutory requirements allowing the practice
defy the reasoning apparent in the foundational article I, section 17
jurisprudence. Furthermore, the practical effects of LFO imprisonment
fail to satisfy the statutory mandates.
A.

The Statute’s Requirement That Contempt Must Be Remedial
Contradicts the Fundamental Jurisprudence Endorsing Only
Punishment for Criminal Intent

Foundational jurisprudence distinguishes between punishing
individuals for fraudulent conduct that resulted in debt and punishing
individuals for failing to pay previously incurred debts.326 Early courts
were hesitant to allow criminal or fraudulent conduct to go unpunished
merely because it resulted in debt.327 Punishing fraudulent or criminal
conduct resulting in debt was permitted, while coercing payment of
previously incurred debts violated the Constitution. The Court endorsed
only punitive imprisonment, rather than coercive imprisonment intended
to remedy nonpayment. Even the more modern contempt-versus-civildebt distinction is predicated on a punitive theory distinguished from
judicial coercion.328 It is constitutional to imprison LFO defaulters, not
to coerce payment of the debt, but to punish disrespect for the court.329
However, the statute allowing imprisonment for LFO nonpayment
sets forth civil, remedial contempt.330 Remedial contempt requires
imprisonment be aimed at remedying nonpayment—it must be
coercive.331 Inversely, remedial contempt cannot be punitive.332
326. See supra notes 235–54 and accompanying text.
327. In re Milecke, 52 Wash. at 316, 100 P. at 744–45 (1909).
328. See supra notes 289–97 and accompanying text.
329. See Austin v. City of Seattle, 176 Wash. 654, 661–62, 30 P.2d 646, 649 (1934) (finding an
ordinance allowing imprisonment for failing to pay a fine fell outside of the purview of article I,
section 7 because “[t]he misdemeanor consists in [sic] a refusal to obey the provisions of the
ordinance, and the fine authorized to be imposed upon conviction is not intended as a payment of
the license tax, but as a punishment for defying the commands of the ordinance”).
330. Smith v. Whatcom Cnty. Dist. Ct., 147 Wash. 2d 98, 110, 52 P.3d 485, 492 (2002)
(referencing WASH. REV. CODE § 7.21.030 (2002)).
331. State v. Nason, 146 Wash. App. 744, 757, 192 P.3d 386, 393 (2008), rev’d in part on other
grounds, 168 Wash. 2d 936, 233 P.3d 848 (2010) (“The primary purpose of the civil contempt
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Imprisoning an individual to coerce payment is contrary to the
constitutional doctrine regarding imprisonment for debt predicated on a
theory of punishment, rejecting imprisonment characterized as judicial
coercion.333 Imprisoning individuals for failing to pay LFOs either
violates the remedial contempt statutes (it is not remedial as required by
the statute because it is a penalty for violating a court order, as mandated
by constitutional jurisprudence) or violates the constitutional
jurisprudence (it is not a penalty as required by the Constitution because
it is intended to coerce payment, as mandated by the remedial statutes).
The Legislature cannot have it both ways.
B.

The Current Practice of Imprisoning Individuals for LFO
Nonpayment Is Not Remedial as Is Required by the Statute

Along similar lines, imprisoning individuals for LFOs may not satisfy
the remedial requirements of the statute at all. Civil contempt may only
be used to the extent it is coercive or remedial in nature.334 However,
there is little evidence the practice is actually remedying LFO
nonpayment.335 In fact, numerous case studies suggest that imprisonment
for LFO default exacerbates LFO non-payment problems.336 In some
cases, the seemingly unsurmountable barrier posed by LFOs actually
causes individuals to cease payments entirely.337 Furthermore,
power is to coerce a party to comply with an order or judgment.”). The Daly court provided further
support for this notion when it stated:
A coercive sanction is justified only on the theory that it will induce a specific act that the court
has the right to coerce . . . . And should it become clear that the civil sanction will not produce
the desired result, the justification for the civil sanction disappears. Further incarceration can
be justified as a punishment for disobeying the court’s orders, but only after a criminal
proceeding.
State ex rel. Daly v. Snyder, 117 Wash. App. 602, 606, 72 P.3d 780, 781 (2003).
332. Washington has separate statutes allowing for punitive contempt. These do not apply to LFO
nonpayment because LFO nonpayment implicates remedial contempt. Smith, 147 Wash. 2d at 110,
52 P.3d at 492 (referencing WASH. REV. CODE § 7.21.030).
333. This is probably where the incongruity between opinions such as Britannia Holdings and
Austin arise. The contempt-versus-civil-debt distinction was promulgated before the court had to
ensure compliance with remedial contempt statutes. Where the Austin Court explained that
individuals can be imprisoned to punish but not to compel debt satisfaction, Austin, 176 Wash. 654,
30 P.2d 646, the Britannia Holdings Court held that individuals can be imprisoned only to compel
payment, while punishing failing to pay would be improper, Britannia Holdings Ltd. v. Greer, 127
Wash. App. 926, 113 P.3d 1041 (2005).
334. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.21.030(2)(a) (2014) (“The imprisonment [for contempt of court] may
extend only so long as it serves a coercive purpose.”).
335. See supra notes 117–39 and accompanying text.
336. Id.
337. Id.
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individuals who are imprisoned cannot make payments while
incarcerated.338 Since imprisonment for failing to pay LFOs is probably
not effectively coercing individuals to satisfy their debts, the practice
does not satisfy the remedial requirements of civil contempt.
CONCLUSION
Imprisonment for failing to pay LFOs in Washington is a practice
inviting institutional challenge. However, modern litigants are not
attacking the system itself. The Washington judiciary has, over time,
substantially abrogated article I, section 17. But the current Court need
not continue down this troublesome path. With a thorough
understanding of Washington’s constitutional jurisprudence, a
thoughtful litigant can explain where past interpretations of article I,
section 17 have impermissibly diverged and present the Court with the
tools it needs to breathe new life into a forgotten protection. A thorough
understanding of article I, section 17’s interpretational evolution reveals
that the foundational jurisprudence contradicts the current statutory
scheme allowing imprisonment for debt. Washington’s Constitution
prohibits imprisonment for failing to pay LFOs and the practice must be
challenged systemically.

338. Id.

